A federal court rejected a putative class action against tea maker Twinings North America, Inc. over antioxidant labeling.  See Craig v. Twinings N. Am., Inc., No. 5:14-CV-05214 (W.D. Ark., 2/5/15).

Craig allegedly purchased Twinings Irish Breakfast Tea and other varieties, and then alleged that defendant had misbranded its products.  Craig contended that Twinings mislabeled its tea as a “natural source of antioxidants” in order to charge a premium for the products. Plaintiff alleged that the “teas do not meet the minimum nutrient level threshold to make such a claim which is 10% or more of the Reference Daily Intake (‘RDI’) or the Daily Reference Value (‘DRV’) of a nutrient with a recognized RDI per reference amount customarily consumed.”  According to Craig, tea that has been labeled this way cannot be legally sold or possessed, and misbranded food has no economic value. She further contended that had she known that the misbranded teas were illegal to sell or possess, she would not have purchased the teas. Craig brought  five claims, based upon violations of the Arkansas Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“AFDCA”), Ark. Code Ann. § 20-56-201, et seq.: (1)
violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“ADTPA”), Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-101, et seq.; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) breach of implied warranty of merchantability;  (4) breach of express warranty; and (5) negligence.

Twining moved to dismiss, arguing Craig’s Complaint was preempted by the FDCA as amended by
the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (“NLEA”). The Supreme Court has long recognized that state laws that conflict with federal law are “without effect.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).  That is, Congress has the power to preempt state laws. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152–53 (1982). Federal preemption occurs when: (1) Congress enacts a statute that explicitly preempts state law; (2) state law actually conflicts with federal law; or (3) federal law occupies a legislative field to such an extent that it is reasonable to conclude that Congress left no room for state regulation in that field.” See generally In re Aurora Dairy Corp. Organic Milk Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 621 F. 3d 781, 791-94 (8th Cir. 2010). In the instant case, only express preemption was at issue.

The FDCA grants the FDA the responsibility to protect public health by ensuring that “foods are safe, wholesome, sanitary, and properly labeled.” 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2). There is no private right of action under the FDCA. 21 U.S.C. § 337(a). In 1990 Congress passed the NLEA, amending the FDCA, to specifically address labeling requirements for certain food and beverage products. Pub. L. No. 101–535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990). The NLEA provides for national uniform nutrition labeling and expressly preempts state law that is inconsistent with its requirements. 21 U.S.C. § 343–1(a).

Twinings argued that Craig was making an end-run around the private action bar by indirectly bringing a claim to obtain redress for an alleged violation of the FDA labeling regulations. While the NLEA expressly preempts state labeling laws that cover certain described foods, 21 U.S.C. § 343–1, it does not preempt requirements imposed by state law that effectively parallel the NLEA. See, e.g., N. Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d 114, 123 (2nd Cir. 2009); In re Simply Orange Juice Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 2013 WL 781785, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 1, 2013); Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural Beverage Co., 268 F.R.D. 365, 370 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The purpose of the NLEA is not to preclude all state regulation of nutritional labeling, but to prevent states from adopting inconsistent requirements with respect to the labeling of nutrients. Astiana v. Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., 2011 WL 2111796, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2011); Pub. L. No. 101–535, 104 Stat. 2353, 2364 (1990). Thus, the preemption issue here was whether the label violations on which Craig based her claim impose a requirement pursuant to state law that differs from the FDCA.

Craig’s claims were ostensibly based on the AFDCA, which impliedly adopts the federal provisions as its own. See e.g. Ark. Code Ann. 20-56-209(7) (declaring food to be “misbranded” if it falls
short of standards prescribed by the FDCA). Craig contended that any labeling violation of
the AFDCA is also a violation of the ADTPA and drives her remaining state law claims.

A claim that expressly or implicitly characterizes the level of a nutrient of the type required to be in nutrition labeling may not be made on the label or in labeling of foods unless the claim is made in accordance with federal regulation. 21 C.F.R. § 101.13(b).  The labels attached to the Complaint attest that the tea is a “natural source of antioxidants,” but did not characterize the level of the antioxidants, and thus were not nutrient-content claims as defined in the regs.  “Natural” does not modify the word “source” to indicate the level of the ingredient.. The generic phrase “natural source of antioxidants” did not appear to the court to be either an express or implied nutrient-content claim. Express claims are those that make a direct statement about the level (or range) of a nutrient in the food, and implied nutrient-content claims are those that describe a food or an ingredient in a manner that suggests that a nutrient is absent or present in a certain amount (e.g., “high in oat bran”).  Here, the challenged statement did not fall under either category, as it did not make an
explicit claim or statement regarding antioxidants.

Further, tea and coffee are exempt from certain labeling requirements if they contain insignificant amounts of all of the nutrients and food components required to be included in the declaration of nutrition information.  Antioxidants are not listed in the nutrients required to be on the label.

The court concluded that Craig’s suit could not continue, as the very crux of her argument was that the term “natural source of antioxidants” is a misbranding of Twinings’ teas, and is therefore illegal.
Even if Twinings’ labels contain nutrient-content claims, the product labels do not violate the FDA’s labeling requirements because they do not characterize the level of antioxidants.  Because Craig’s allegations did not violate the FDCA, any related state law claims arising from the same facts were preempted. If allowed to proceed, the state law claims would impose liability inconsistent with the FDCA.

Turning to Craig’s false representation claim, the Court observed that while Craig alleged that “natural source of antioxidants” is a false representation affirmatively made to her by Twinings, and she relied on this representation in making the decision to purchase the teas, Craig has not suffered actual damages as contemplated by the statute.  Craig’s alleged damages were based solely upon Twinings’ alleged violation of the FDA’s general nutrient content labeling regulations. In the instant case, Craig paid for tea and received tea. The Court could not find, therefore, that this product was “not at all what defendant represented.”