We’ve posted before about the curious phenomenon of plaintiffs suing about the labeling on a product they never even purchased. Recently class certification was denied in yet another case alleging false labeling on a product the named plaintiff did not buy See Major v. Ocean Spray Cranberries Inc., No. 12-03067 (N.D. Cal., 6/10/13). We flag this case for our readers, because of the court’s emphasis on the Rule 23(a) element of typicality instead of the equally applicable notion of standing.
Plaintiff alleged that she purchased several of defendant’s products in California. Her Complaint stated that Plaintiff purchased various “Ocean Spray juices and drinks” that were allegedly improperly labeled “No Sugar Added,” or were bearing improper nutrient content claims, or had misrepresentations that the products were free from artificial colors, flavors or preservatives. She alleged the usual causes of action, including violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. (counts 1–3); violation of the False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500 et seq., (counts 4–5); violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq. (count 6); restitution based on unjust enrichment or quasi-contract (count 7); and breach of warranty (8).
She sought certification of a class of similar purchasers. Rule 23(a)(3) requires that a named plaintiff’s claims be typical of those that would be advanced by the proposed class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The test for Rule 23(a) typicality in the Ninth Circuit is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct. See Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010); Ries v. Arizona Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
In the context of cases involving several products at issue —like this one— district courts have held that the typicality requirement has not been met where the named plaintiff purchased a different product than that purchased by unnamed, absent class, plaintiffs. Wiener, 255 F.R.D. at 666; see also Gonzalez v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 247 F.R.D. 616 (S.D. Cal. 2007); Lewis Tree Serv., Inc. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 211 F.R.D. 228 (S.D.N.Y.2002); Kaczmarek v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 186 F.R.D. 307, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
With that standard in mind, here the court found that plaintiff, the proposed class representative, had not met her burden of showing that her claims are typical of those of the proposed class members pursuant to Rule 23(a)(3). The primary reason behind the court’s determination that the typicality requirement had not been met is that plaintiff’s proposed classes were so broad and indefinite that they encompassed products that she herself did not purchase. See Wiener, 255 F.R.D. at 666. In her deposition, plaintiff asserted that she purchased five of the defendants’ products. But the putative class definitions that plaintiff wanted the court to certify would have included a whole host of other products that plaintiff had nothing to do with. For example, the putative class would include any of defendant’s products “represented to contain no artificial colors, flavors or preservatives but which contained artificial colors, flavors or preservatives.” The putative class also included entire lines of products; as an example, any product from the “Sparkling” line of products. However, in both of these examples, plaintiff failed to make an allegation that she purchased all of such products, all the products in these product lines. As such, the claims of the unnamed plaintiffs who purchased products plaintiff herself did not buy were not fairly encompassed by the named plaintiff’s claims.
The second basis of the finding that plaintiff’s claims failed to meet the Rule 23(a) typicality requirement is the fact that the labels and nutrition claims on each of the products at issue was unique to that product itself. For example, plaintiff based her mislabeling causes of action with regard to the Diet Sparkling Pomegranate Blueberry drink product, in part, on the claims made on the specific label of this specific drink product — language that included specific claims about blueberries, applicable only to drinks containing blueberries. The evidence needed to prove plaintiff’s claim that the Diet Sparkling Pomegranate Blueberry drink contained false or misleading labeling was not probative of the claims of unnamed class members who purchased products within the “Sparkling” line that did not contain blueberries.