The federal court in New Jersey recently granted summary judgment to a drug manufacturer in a failure to warn claim under Texas law. See Solomon v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 07-1102 (D.N.J., 1/3/12). The opinion offers a number of useful observations.
The case involved Plavix, a drug that inhibits blood platelets from forming clots. The drug is often used in patients with recent heart attack, stroke, or diagnosed peripheral vascular disease, to prevent dangerous clots.Taking Plavix, like any medicine, is not without risk. Because it functions by inhibiting the formation of blood clots, Plavix increases the risk of bleeding. The manufacturer warned of this risk extensively on the label.
In November 2002, Plaintiff suffered a heart attack, and his doctors placed two metal stents in his arteries to maintain blood flow to his heart. At that time, one of his doctors prescribed Plavix with aspirin in order “to prevent clots.” Subsequently, Plaintiff’s treating cardiologist continued this prescription. In July 2005, Plaintiff began suffering gastrointestinal bleeding, which led him to sue Defendants asserting product liability related causes of action, under Texas state law, for defective design, manufacturing defect, failure to warn, and negligence. All these claims essentially turned on whether Defendants adequately warned that Plavix carried a risk of bleeding complications.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, relying in large measure on the learned intermediary doctrine. Readers will recall that within the prescription drug context, where a plaintiff sues the manufacturer of a prescription drug for failing to adequately warn of the drug’s effects, Texas courts employ the learned intermediary doctrine. As the Texas Supreme Court has explained, the underlying premise for the learned intermediary doctrine is that prescription drugs are complex and vary in effect, depending on the unique circumstances of an individual user, and for this reason, patients can obtain them only through a prescribing physician. Indeed, a patient’s doctor, who stands between the patient and the drug manufacturer, is in the best position to professionally evaluate the patient’s needs, assess the risks and benefits of available drugs, prescribe one, and supervise its use. Hence, if the doctor is properly warned of the possibility of a side effect and is advised of the symptoms normally accompanying the side effect, it is anticipated that injury to the patient will often be avoided. Recognizing the doctor-patient relationship, the doctrine excuses a drug manufacturer from warning each patient who receives the product when the manufacturer properly warns the prescribing physician of the product’s dangers.
In arguing the warning claim, Plaintiff contended that he was entitled to a heeding presumption that proper warnings would have a made a difference and that this presumption excused him from proving causation. However, Texas law creates no such presumption. The Fifth Circuit has noted that neither Texas nor federal courts applying Texas law have applied the read-and-heed
presumption to pharmaceutical cases involving learned intermediaries. Indeed, Texas has explicitly rejected the Restatement (SECOND) Of Torts § 402A, Comment j’s read-and-heed presumption for policy reasons and, said the court, because it has been superseded by Restatement (THIRD) Of Torts::Products Liability § 2.
On the factual assertions of failure to warn, the court found that although Plaintiff presented various studies and articles challenging the efficacy of Plavix in certain types of patients, none of those studies were relevant to Plaintiff’s medical situation. For example, the studies upon which Plaintiff tried to rely regarding Plavix’s alleged ineffectiveness for patients 75 years or older had no relevance since Plaintiff was well under 75 years old when he stopped taking the drug. More fundamentally, many of Plaintiff’s arguments seemed to center on an alleged lack of efficacy; Plaintiff’s efficacy arguments were not relevant in the context of a failure-to-warn analysis. Plaintiff’s claim was essentially premised on the fact that he suffered substantial bleeding, while his response to the motion argued Plavix did not work. A proper warning should adequately alert any danger or harm that may result from ingesting the drug; efficacyis a separate issue. Permitting Plaintiff to pursue his failure-to-warn claim on an efficacy theory would, as has been found in other jurisdictions with similar laws, impermissibly expand liability under Texas law on the adequacy of pharmaceutical warning labels.
Focusing on the alleged inadequacy of the warning, Texas law is clear that when a warning appropriately and specifically mentions the circumstances complained of, the warning is adequate as a matter of law. First and foremost, said the court, the warning label here clearly cautioned users that PLAVIX use with aspirin was associated with an increase in bleeding. Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence to show that the risk levels published on the Plavix warning label were inaccurate, insofar as the warnings concerned the risk of bleeding.
Another ground for summary judgment. In addition to proving inaccuracy, Plaintiff had to show that
the allegedly defective warning label was the producing cause of Plaintiff’s injury. Thus, it was Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that the treating physician would not have used or prescribed the product but for the inadequate warning. However, the cardiologist insisted that despite the risks, it was important that these drugs were prescribed to Plaintiff to prevent a life-threatening problem. The doctor acknowledged that the therapy could cause serious risk of bleeding in patients. Nevertheless, the cardiologist insisted that despite the risks, it was important to prescribe the drug. Furthermore, throughout the prescribing doctor’s deposition, he consistently testified that he did not rely on Plavix warning labels. Texas law is clear on causation: when the prescribing physician is aware of the product’s risks and decides to use it anyway, any inadequacy of the product’s warning, as a matter of law, is not the producing cause of the patient’s injuries. It was clear that the doctors were aware of the serious risks of bleeding when placing Plaintiff on the medicine.
Plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim failed for the additional reason that, under Texas law, Defendants are presumed not liable because the Plavix warning labels were approved by the FDA. In Texas, where prescription drug manufacturers comply with the FDA regulations, Texas law creates a rebuttable presumption of non-liability in prescription drug suits. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code. Ann. § 82.007.
Summary judgment granted.