The U.S. Supreme Court agreed last week to hear argument in a case in which the lower courts wrestled with the issue whether, at the class certification stage, a district court must resolve Daubert issues. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, U.S., No. 11-864 (cert. granted 6/25/12). The Court indicated it was interested in the question “whether a district court may certify a class action without resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a classwide basis.”
Readers will recall that in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) the Supreme Court in dicta referenced the question. Justice Scalia observed that the district court had “concluded that Daubert did not apply to expert testimony at the certification stage of class-action proceedings,” but the majority replied that “we doubt that is so.” 131 S. Ct. at 2554. Thus, Dukes strongly suggested that it was appropriate for defendants to make the expert challenge at the class certification stage, and important for the court to resolve the issue then; the Comcast litigation may see the Court turn that persuasive dicta into binding precedent.
Most district courts have been following the dicta. Historically, the Circuits have split. The 8th and 9th Circuits call for an expert inquiry at this stage, and in American Honda, which we commented on here, the Seventh Circuit previously held that where an expert’s report or testimony is critical to class certification, a district court must conclusively rule on any challenge to the expert’s qualifications or submissions prior to ruling on the class certification motion. 600 F.3d at 815–16. Later, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its holding from American Honda, ruling that it was error for a district court to decline to rule on a Daubert motion at the class certification stage. Messner v. Northshore Univ. Healthsystem, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 731, *17 (7th Cir. Jan. 13, 2012).
The 3rd Circuit went in another direction. The district court in Comcast originally certified a class; following the court of appeals’ decision in Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d 305, the district court granted in part Comcast‘s motion to reconsider its certification decision. After further briefing, plaintiffs got the case re-certified after convincing the district court that they could show that they had an expert methodology to prove damages on a classwide basis. On the current appeal, the Third Circuit agreed that the lower court had applied the “rigorous analysis,” adding that at the class certification stage, “we are precluded from addressing any merits inquiry unnecessary to making a Rule 23 determination.” The Petitioners argued that the Third Circuit affirmed the certification order after expressly declining to consider several “merits” issues necessary to determine whether, as required by Rule 23(b)(3), common questions predominate over individual ones.
So the Comcast case may give the Supreme Court a chance to further explain what exactly a rigorous analysis should entail, especially with respect to alleged class-wide damages. The focus on damages, which some have viewed as narrowing the issue presented, still is a question that arises not just in antitrust cases, but also in mass torts, which are front and center for our readers.