A federal court recently rejected plaintiffs’ class certification bid in a suit against Ford Motor Co. relating to diesel engines in some vehicles. Corder v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:05-CV-00016 (W.D. Ky., 7/25/12).
Corder brought an action against Ford for allegedly violating the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act (“KCPA”). Corder alleged that the diesel engines installed in model year 2003 F-Series Super Duty Trucks and Excursions were “highly problematic.” Plaintiff then allegedly purchased a model year 2004 Ford F-250 Super Duty Truck with what he claimed was a “2003 engine” that did not have the improvements that were in the “2004 engine” According to plaintiff, non-disclosure of installation of the “2003 engine” in his model year 2004 truck was an unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive act within the meaning of the KCPA.
Ford noted that it makes running changes to its vehicles, including the engines, throughout the year. Purchasers of 2004 model year trucks built prior to October of 2003 received multiple slightly different engines, and all of those engines were improved over engines installed on most 2003 vehicles.
Following initial discovery, Ford moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, finding that Corder had not shown that Ford’s actions were false, misleading, or deceptive within the meaning of the KCPA, nor had Corder shown that he suffered an “ascertainable loss,” as is required to maintain a private action under the KCPA. The Sixth Circuit disagreed. Corder v. Ford Motor Co., 285 F. App’x 226 (6th Cir. 2008). Upon remand, Corder filed a motion to certify a national class, but the district court found that a national class was not viable because the laws of each of the states in which the putative class members purchased their vehicles would have to be applied, which would lead to significant problems of individualized proof and manageability.
Plaintiff then amended, seeking to represent a class of only Kentucky residents. The court concluded that Rule 23(b)(3) was still not met. In order to meet the demand of Rule 23(b)(3) that common issues predominate, a plaintiff must show that the issues in the class action that are subject to generalized proof, and thus applicable to the class as a whole, predominate over those issues that are subject only to individualized proof. Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 564 (6th Cir. 2007). The predominance requirement in Rule 23(b)(3) guards against certifying class actions that could overwhelm or confuse a jury or compromise a party’s defense. Thus, certification is not appropriate unless it is determinable from the outset that the individual issues can be considered in a manageable, time-efficient, and fair manner.
For Ford to be liable for damages under the KCPA, plaintiff had to establish that: (1) the person purchased or leased a Ford vehicle in question primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; (2) the person suffered an ascertainable loss; and (3) the loss was a result of an unfair, false, misleading or deceptive act or practice.
In this case, the need to determine the primary purpose for each customer’s purchase required an individualized inquiry that would overwhelm any alleged common issues. The trucks
at issue were not the type of product about which it may be inferred that all, or even the vast majority, were purchased primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose. Indeed there was evidence suggesting that a large number of the purchasers of the trucks at issue bought them primarily for commercial use. And the Ford Design Analysis Engineer stated that it was “designed for heavy-duty use, including commercial use, and was too large to fit in many home garages.” The court noted that the burden on a class certification motion belongs to the plaintiff, In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 678 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2012), but Corder offered no evidence controverting the suggestion that numerous customers purchased their trucks either partially or wholly for commercial purposes. Litigation of that issue would require individualized inquiries into numerous class members. Clearly, the question of why any particular customer purchased the pickup truck was not something that can be resolved on a classwide basis.
Moreover, this element was a subjective one by its terms, focusing on the reasons underlying a
particular person’s reasons for purchasing a truck. Indeed, the statute did not restrict claims
to those purchasers whose only purpose was personal, family, or household related, but required
only that such a purpose be the primary one. That a purchaser can have a commercial purpose for the purchase of a truck, so long as that is only a secondary purpose, made the individualized inquiries and their resolution by a jury all the more detailed and complicated.
So far, a solid but not particularly uncommon analysis. What is especially worthwhile for readers of MassTortDefense is that plaintiff, as is growing more common, suggested that the court could simply use questionnaires, claim forms, or “judicial notice” to resolve the primary use inquiry. But none of those suggestions allowed for Ford to do what Ford was entitled to do: litigate the issue before a jury with respect to each customer for whom the relevant facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom are disputed. The requirement that a person have purchased a product primarily for personal, family, or household use prior to a finding of liability under KRS § 367.220 is an explicit element of the statute. Ford, of course, had every right to demand a full litigation of that element of the cause of action, and for each putative class member no less. The Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 23, to “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Accordingly, a court could not certify a class action under the premise that Ford would not be entitled to fully litigate that statutory element in front of a jury, at least for those class members where the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom are disputed. See Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2561 (“Because the Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting Rule 23 to ‘abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,’ a class cannot be certified on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims”).
While plaintiff also argued that an “appropriate trial plan” would allow for resolution of the necessary individualized inquiries, he did not provide any detailed suggestion as to what sort of appropriate trial plan would allow for the resolution of the potentially numerous individualized inquiries without overwhelming the trial and the jury. Simply put, plaintiff could not meet his burden of showing that class certification was appropriate by making conclusory statements about questionnaires, judicial notice, or an appropriate trial plan.