A federal court has granted a software maker summary judgment in a case arising from the use of “spyware.” The plaintiff failed to convince the court that product liability claims were proper against the company who made the software the plaintiff’s former wife allegedly targeted him with. Hayes v. SpectorSoft Corp., 2009 WL 3713284 (E.D.Tenn. 11/3/09).
Plaintiff alleged that his former wife purchased software, including one called the “Spector Professional Edition for Windows,” and installed it on his computer. Plaintiff contends that following the installation of these software programs, the software recorded all his chat conversations, instant messages, e-mails sent and received, and the websites visited by plaintiff whenever he used his laptop computer, and re-transmitted such electronic communication to her (or a sister). SpectorSoft’s software is apparently primarily used by parents and employers to monitor Internet use by children and employees.
The parties disputed whether SpectorSoft knew of the illegal use of the SpectorSoft software to gain access to plaintiff’s private laptop communications. Plaintiff alleged that SpectorSoft knew or should have known about such usage. He thus asserted several causes of action (including negligence) against SpectorSoft for its alleged role in allowing his personal computer usage to be captured– and that defendant “aided and abetted” in the violation of his rights.
The court concluded first that plaintiff had not created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether SpectorSoft aided and abetted the alleged invasion of his privacy. There was no evidence that SpectorSoft took an affirmative act that encouraged the women to violate plaintiff’s rights. In fact, SpectorSoft attempted to protect the rights of persons like plaintiff by requiring purchasers to accept its licensing terms prior to being allowed to install its software (which prohibited this kind of use). There was similarly no evidence that SpectorSoft knew anything about how the women were using its software. While some retailers marketed SpectorSoft’s products to spouses concerned about adultery, SpectorSoft itself did not market its product for such uses, and it provided its users with a licensing agreement that it had reason to believe was valid. Furthermore, said the court, even a broad-based marketing campaign does not provide the requisite affirmative act of specific encouragement or assistance to the individuals at issue in this case.
Turning to the claim under the state Products Liability Act , a seller of a consumer product may be liable for “injury to a person or property caused by the product” if “the product is determined to be in a defective condition or unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the control of the manufacturer or seller.” The court did not reach the issue whether software constitutes a “product” under the statute (nor the “misuse” issue which springs to mind), because the Act defines a “product liability action” as one brought “for or on account of personal injury, death or property damage.” But plaintiff cited to no Tennessee authority suggesting that a products liability claim can be brought for emotional injuries alone, unaccompanied by some sort of physical injury or actual damage to property. Plaintiff did not allege in his Complaint that the alleged invasion of his privacy actually damaged his property, such as his computer or his business.
Similarly, plaintiff failed to provide appropriate legal support for his general negligence claim. Tennessee law does recognize a claim for general emotional distress caused by the negligent actions of another in the form of a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. See Eskin v. Bartee, 262 S.W.3d 727, 733 (Tenn.Sup.Ct.2008). But the Tennessee Supreme Court has established that where a case is purely one for emotional injury unaccompanied by damages for physical injury or other damages, the plaintiff must present material evidence as to each of the five elements of general negligence –duty, breach of duty, injury or loss, causation in fact, and proximate or legal, cause — and, in order to guard against trivial or fraudulent actions, the law ought to provide recovery only for “serious” or “severe” emotional injury.
On the duty element, the general duty of care does not include an affirmative duty to act for the protection of another, unless the defendant stands in some special relationship to either the person who is the source of the danger, or to the person who is foreseeably at risk from the danger. There is no precedent for the proposition that a manufacturer of spyware software owes a duty to avoid emotional injury to the victim of the misuse of that software in violation of the software’s licensing agreement. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate legal support for the proposition that SpectorSoft had a special relationship or that SpectorSoft somehow assumed a duty of care towards plaintiff.
Finally, plaintiff failed to present evidence of his severe or serious emotional distress. Without such evidence of severe emotional distress, plaintiff’s negligence claim that asserts only garden variety anxiety and mental distress as damages must be dismissed.