A federal judge in Florida has dismissed the class action claims of plaintiffs asserting economic loss from Bayer’s drug Trasylol, ruling that they have failed to adequately plead that their alleged damages flowed directly from the company’s alleged conduct in marketing the drug. See Southeast Laborers Health and Welfare Fund, et al. v. Bayer Corporation, et al., 2009 WL 2355747 (S.D. Fla.).
Trasylol was approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to prevent excessive bleeding during coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery. The plaintiffs, including a health and welfare fund responsible for paying for members’ prescription drugs, allege that cheaper and safer alternatives were available but that Bayer somehow “over-promoted” the drug for CABG use. They also allege the company promoted it for unapproved off-label uses, such as orthopedic surgery. They say, bottom line, that they would not have paid for Trasylol had they known the true story.
Such claims are typical of the consumer fraud act claims of plaintiffs in drug litigation, and equally typical is the fact that calculation of plaintiff’s alleged losses would be extremely difficult, fact intensive, and absent such facts, purely speculative. Plaintiff must allege the causation element of the claim, and even the requisite short and plain statement of the claim requires more than labels and conclusions, and more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ).
In a causation analysis that applies to both the consumer fraud act and RICO allegations, the court noted that there are many factors that a doctor may consider in determining what medication to administer to a given patient. Doctors are presumed to, and actually do, go beyond advertising and marketing and also use their independent knowledge in making medical decisions. Loss calculation, therefore, necessarily would require an analysis of whether or not a particular physician ever received or relied on Bayer’s allegedly fraudulent statements, and whether or not a physician, knowing the risks vs. benefit of Trasylol, would still have used it during an operation.
It would require a determination as to how many doses a patient received, and whether or not the number of doses was tied into any fraudulent marketing. It would also require speculation as to what alternative medications a particular physician would have ordered in a particular surgery, and how much that medication would have cost. Such a cost calculation would be problematic, as costs clearly would have fluctuated over the ten year period. Lastly, it would entail determining those patients who received Trasylol who did not suffer any adverse reactions, and who might have been helped by the use of the drug. Plaintiffs plead none of those facts.
The plaintiffs here attempted to rely on a “fraud on the market” theory to avoid this analysis, citing In re Zyprexa Prod Liab. Litig., 493 F.Supp.2d 571 (E.D. N.Y. 2007), but the court called this “simply misplaced.” The fraud-on-the-market doctrine in both the Eleventh and Third Circuits has been held to be limited strictly to securities cases and is inappropriate in claims alleging deceptive advertising such as the ones presented by drug litigation.
Further, on the RICO count, the court said that the plaintiffs’ factual allegations were not sufficient to constitute a representative sample of the defendants’ allegedly fraudulent acts, when they occurred and who engaged in them.
Judge Middlebrooks granted the plaintiffs leave to amend but said it was “unlikely” they would be able to cure the proximate causation deficiency in their claims.