The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently agreed to hear Eli Lilly’s appeal of a federal district court’s orders granting class certification and denying summary judgment in litigation over its anti-psychotic medication, Zyprexa. See In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation, 08-4685-mv (2d Cir. 1/15/09).
Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the the Eastern District of New York had granted class certification last fall to a group of third-party payers, including insurance companies, who were suing Eli Lilly for alleged overpayment after the company allegedly exaggerated the benefits of the drug and supposedly failed to disclose certain side effects. The 2d Circuit has now granted the 23(f) motion for leave to appeal.
Readers of MassTortDefense may recall that the 2d Circuit just last year in McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008), overruled Judge Weinstein’s certification of a class of “light” cigarette smokers, finding that individualized issues regarding reliance, loss causation, damages and injury all precluded a finding that common issues predominated over individualized ones as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). The Zyprexa class claim was brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1964, as plaintiffs seek to take advantage of their reading of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 128 S. Ct. 2131 (2008), regarding reliance in a RICO fraud claim.
In certifying the class in Zyprexa, Judge Weinstein applied his take on the reasoning in Bridge, finding that third-party payers had colorable claims based on the allegedly fraudulent statements made to and relied upon by doctors who prescribed the drugs (not parties). As warned of in our post here last year, the Supreme Court had appeared to reject the defense argument that the proximate cause requirement inherent in the “by reason of” language of the RICO statute demands that a civil RICO plaintiff asserting a claim based on fraud establish his reliance on a misrepresentation by the defendant. In the context of a civil RICO claim predicated on fraud, the required causal link demands a showing that the plaintiff relied on an alleged misrepresentation made to the plaintiff by the defendant. Otherwise, the causal relationship between the alleged injury and the alleged fraud is too attenuated.
The Court appeared to reject petitioners’ arguments that under the “common-law meaning” rule, Congress should be presumed to have made reliance an element of a civil RICO claim predicated on a violation of the mail fraud statute. And rejected the argument that a plaintiff bringing a RICO claim based on mail fraud must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations in order to establish proximate cause. The Court felt it had no ability to respond to the policy argument that RICO should be interpreted to require first-party reliance for fraud-based claims in order to avoid the “overfederalization” of traditional state law claims. A RICO plaintiff who alleges injury by reason of a pattern of mail fraud cannot prevail without showing that someone relied on the defendant’s misrepresentations. But that does not mean, under one reading of Bridge, that the only injuries proximately caused by the misrepresentation are those suffered by the recipient.
The Court’s decision on reliance was based on statutory interpretation, rather than logic or common sense. We predicted that the absence of a clear reliance requirement may in fact make this type of claim even more popular with mass tort plaintiffs. And we are seeing its potential effect on class certification decisions in some district courts.