A federal court has issued an opinion on an important aspect of the Class Action Fairness Act, namely whether the denial of class action status deprives a federal court of jurisdiction under the Act. In Kitts v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 2009 WL 192550 (W.D. La., 1/23/09), the district court declined to remand to state court a personal injury action stemming from an oil spill. Although some district courts have held that post-removal events such as class certification denial can render the court without subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA, the Western District of Louisiana held that the better approach is to retain jurisdiction.

On June 15, 2007, plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit in state court in Louisiana, claiming damages resulting from a 2006 oil spill alleged to have occurred from a facility owned and operated by defendant. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged they suffered injuries from this spill, respiratory problems and illnesses, sinus damage, difficulty breathing, and burning of the throat and nasal passages. Defendant removed, based on CAFA. The federal district court later denied class certification. Plaintiffs then filed a Motion to Remand alleging that remand to state court was appropriate because the refusal to certify this matter as a class action divested the court of subject matter jurisdiction.

The court, however, found compelling the reasoning of those cases finding jurisdiction continues to exist even after denial of the class action. Particularly appropriate was the conclusion reached by the Southern District of Florida in Colomar v. Mercy Hospital, Inc., 2007 WL 2083562, *3 (S.D.Fla.07/20/2007). In support of its denial of a Motion to Remand filed in a case properly removed under CAFA, but after the minimally diverse defendant was dismissed and class certification was denied, the Florida district court stated that the courts considering the issue of whether a federal court retains jurisdiction after class certification is denied have concluded that case developments subsequent to removal do not alter the courts’ CAFA jurisdiction, if jurisdiction was proper at the time of removal.

The court quoted from the CAFA legislative history, the Senate Report stating that “once a complaint is properly removed to federal court, the federal court’s jurisdiction cannot be ousted by later events…. If a federal court’s jurisdiction could be ousted by events occurring after a case was removed, plaintiffs who believed the tide was turning against them could simply always amend their complaint months (or even years) into the litigation to require remand to state court…. [I]f subsequent events could unravel a federal court’s jurisdiction, a defendant could prevail on the merits, only to have the federal court conclude that it lacks jurisdiction to enter judgment.”  S. Rep. 109-14, 109th Cong., 1st Sess.2005, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.CA.N. 3, *70-71, *66-67.

Here, the court said that to litigate the case up to the eve of trial, and then to seek remand after adverse rulings have issued and summary judgment is briefed, equates to a forum shopping. Plaintiffs admitted that this matter was properly removed under CAFA. Plaintiffs’ efforts to unravel jurisdiction on the eve of trial was forum shopping which the traditional rules of removal and remand are designed to preclude.