There has been significant discussion of preemption recently, particularly in the medical device and drug context. A recent decision under the Federal Railroad Safety Act offers some insight into potentially important aspects of the doctrine, and particularly when Congressional action may affect preemption.

In Lundeen v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 2008 WL 2597958 (8th Cir. July 2, 2008), the Eighth Circuit confronted a situation in which a legislative amendment, which was retroactive to the date of the relevant incident, had the apparent effect of reinstating a suit which had been preempted.

In January, 2002, a freight train operated by Canadian Pacific Railway Co. derailed in North Dakota, releasing a cloud of anhydrous ammonia. Nearby residents sued in state court, alleging respiratory disease and eye damage. Defendants removed based on federal question jurisdiction, but plaintiffs amended their complaint to delete reference to federal law. The district court then ruled that the cases should be remanded to Minnesota state court. Canadian Pacific appealed the ruling, and the Eighth Circuit found that the claims were preempted under the Federal Railroad Safety Act. The cases were remanded to the district court, which dismissed on the merits.

Plaintiffs appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the Act was amended, retroactive to the date of the train derailment. The amendment stated that “nothing in this section shall be construed to preempt an action under State law seeking damages for personal injury, death, or property damage alleging that a party …has failed to comply with the Federal standard of care established by a regulation or order issued by the Secretary of Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters), or … has failed to comply with a State law, regulation, or order that is not incompatible with [federal law].” This “clarifying” amendment reflected Congress’s disagreement with the manner in which the courts, including the Eighth Circuit, had interpreted the Act to preempt state law causes of action whenever a federal regulation covered the same subject matter as the allegations of negligence in a state court lawsuit.

Defendants argued that applying the amendment here: 1) would violate the U.S. Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine; 2) violate due process; 3) violate equal protection; and 4) violate the ex post facto clause.

The appeals court rejected the railroad’s separation of powers argument, citing Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211 (1995), for the notion that the doctrine is violated only when Congress tries to apply new law to cases which have already reached a final judgment. Here, the amendment became effective while these cases were on appeal and had not reached final judgments. The Supreme Court has reiterated that Congress possesses the power to amend existing law even if the amendment affects the outcome of pending cases.

The court also denied the due process challenge. The railroad had the burden of showing there is no rational basis for the law. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993). Indeed, the court noted it reviews legislation regulating economic and business affairs under a “highly deferential rational basis” standard of review. The sufficient rational basis for the amendment, said the court, was to give railroad accident victims the right to seek recovery in state courts when they allege railroads violate safety standards. Prior to the amendment, the relevant section had been interpreted in such a way that an injured person’s state law claims were preempted. It was “rational” for Congress to clarify this result was not an intended purpose of the Act.

No equal rights violation was recognized despite the amendment imposing different standards on railroads that caused harm before and after the effective date. Every retroactive statute, by necessity, imposes different standards on parties affected by the statute, and those differences are directly tied to the statute’s effective date.

Finally, the court said, the amendment does not violate the Ex Post Facto clause, because there is no proof that Congress intended the amendment as a criminal penalty. The Ex Post Facto clause applies only to criminal penalties, and clear proof is needed to support the argument that a civil remedy is so “punitive” in purpose or effect as to be in essence a criminal penalty.

In an interesting dissent, Judge Beam disagreed with the majority view of retroactivity. Because the case had already been up on appeal on an issue of federal jurisdiction there was a final decision that could not be undone by legislation.

Of more interest to readers of MassTortDefense is his argument that the court should have followed Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 999 (2008) and its discussion of the preemption precedent established in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); and Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005).

“I concede that the MDA as discussed in Riegel deals with a product or service different from that of the FRSA. But, for preemption analysis, any differences are immaterial-the preemption language and the regulatory requirements are analogous. For federal preemption purposes, a medical device manufactured and marketed under a regime employing specific federal safety requirements is little different from a railroad service formulated and delivered under specific federal safety regulations. Thus, Riegel provides the precedent we must apply.”

And “Like the medical device in Riegel, the railroad service in Lundeen is entitled to be delivered free of state requirements that differ from the federal regime. And, when the amended statute is properly construed, the limited state cause of action authorized by FRSA II fits within that paradigm. So, with minor exceptions not applicable in Lundeen, all state railroad safety requirements that are in addition to or different from those established under FRSA II are preempted. Paraphrasing Justice Scalia’s comment in Riegel, excluding North Dakota common law duties from the scope of the FRSA II preemption scheme would make little sense.”

Thus, the dissent argued that Congress had authorized the creation of a state cause of action, but at the same time carefully protected the concept of federal uniformity established by the Act. This cause of action is limited to allegations regarding the failure of a defendant to comply with the federal standards of care established by regulation or order issued by the Secretary of Transportation, or the failure to comply with a plan, rule or standard created pursuant to regulation or order of the Secretary. This limited claim for damages preserves the federal uniformity demanded by the FRSA. Accordingly, any state law cause of action permitting railroad liability based upon more expansive state-based requirements than those directly established by the Secretary’s regulations, rules or orders, does not pass muster under the amended Act, said the dissent.