The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued an interesting medical monitoring ruling last week, which dealt with who is a proper defendant for this type of claim. In Sheridan, et al. v. NGK Metals, No. 06-5510, 2008 WL 2156718 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2008), the court addressed the potential liability for medical monitoring relief of a unique type of defendant, a consultant hired to sample and monitor air quality.
The decision is noteworthy in the context of plaintiffs’ attempts to expand this non-traditional remedy. (and for another good application of the Twombly pleading decision to a toxic tort context.)
The proposed plaintiff class sought medical monitoring for residents of the Reading, Pennsylvania area who were allegedly exposed to beryllium emitted into the air from one of the defendant’s manufacturing facilities. According to the plaintiffs, members of the proposed class resided and/or regularly worked in close proximity to the Reading Plant at some time during the period from 1950 to 2000.
Defendant Spotts, Stevens & McCoy (SSM) was an engineering firm that, according to the plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, was involved with testing, sampling, analyzing, and monitoring the air quality and levels of beryllium at the Reading Plant.
The District Court considered SSM’s motion to dismiss, noting that while a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must provide more than labels and conclusions, and more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, under the new Supreme Court guidance in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007).
MassTortDefense has posted on this claim before. Medical monitoring is recognized under Pennsylvania law, and a plaintiff must prove:
1. exposure greater than normal background levels;
2. to a proven hazardous substance;
3. caused by the defendant’s negligence;
4. as a proximate result of the exposure, plaintiff has a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease;
5. a monitoring procedure exists that makes the early detection of the disease possible;
6. the prescribed monitoring regime is different from that normally recommended in the absence of the exposure; and
7. the prescribed monitoring regime is reasonably necessary according to contemporary scientific principles.
Redland Soccer Club v. Dep’t of the Army, 548 Pa. 178, 696 A.2d 137, 145-46 (Pa.1997).
As the third element listed indicates, a medical monitoring plaintiff must prove the underlying tort of negligence in Pennsylvania. And an action in negligence is premised upon the existence of a duty owed by one party to another. Here, plaintiffs alleged that the engineering firm owed them a duty under the notion expressed in Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts regarding Liability to Third Person for Negligent Performance of Undertaking (the so-called “Good Samaritan” rule). It states:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1977).
Pennsylvania is one of many jurisdictions that has adopted Section 324A. See Cantwell v. Allegheny County, 506 Pa. 35, 40, 483 A.2d 1350, 1353 (1984). It has been interpreted to mean that absent any evidence that a defendant assumed an affirmative duty, there can be no liability for negligently performing that duty. See Wenrick v. Schloemann-Siemag Aktiengesellschaft, 523 Pa. 1, 564 A.2d 1244, 1248 (Pa.1989). Section 324A cannot be invoked to create a duty where one does not exist.
Plaintiffs alleged that SSM was responsible for advising the other defendants with regard to the air quality and for informing and/or warning the other defendants (the plant owners) about the results of air sampling and testing. Thus, a duty allegedly existed for SSM to act with reasonable care and prevent any increased risk of harm to the plaintiffs. Defendants responded that because the plaintiffs failed to allege that SSM undertook the specific duty to warn the plaintiffs, or that they negligently performed its undertaken tasks, no claim existed. SSM never expressly undertook a duty to warn the plaintiffs of the harmful beryllium exposures at the Reading Plant.
The Ruling: No Claim
The Court noted that the Amended Complaint did not allege that SSM was negligent in performing the testing, sampling, analyzing or monitoring of the air quality in the Reading Plant, or that the engineers failed to report, or were negligent in reporting, the results of its research to the plant owners. The pleading did not allege any circumstances under which such a duty, as a matter of law, could arise “implicitly” or “derivatively.” And absent a duty owed to the plaintiffs here, the Court need not reach the question of whether plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were foreseeable.
Plaintiffs also needed to properly allege one of the three subsections of Section 324A, (a) failure to exercise reasonable care that increases the risk of harm, or (b) an undertaking to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.
On part (a), plaintiffs confused sins of commission rather than omission when they alleged that SSM allowed beryllium levels at the Reading Plant to rise to unsafe levels. Plaintiffs (discovery was well along) could not allege that SSM assumed or had any control over what caused the beryllium concentrations to rise to excessive levels, or contracted to undertake any corrective action to prevent these excesses from occurring. SSM undertook to test the beryllium emission at the plant, and report those emissions to the plant owners. The Amended Complaint did not allege that Plaintiffs’ injuries arose from any alleged negligent testing.
With respect to subsection (b), plaintiffs argue that the engineering firm undertook to perform a duty owed by the plant owners to the plaintiffs. However, SSM agreed to take the steps of merely testing, sampling, monitoring, etc. Mere knowledge of a dangerous situation does not suffice to impose liability under Section 324A(b). Finally, as to subsection (c), plaintiffs failed to allege that they suffered any harm because of their reliance upon SSM undertaking to perform certain tests for the plant owners.
The Court concluded that plaintiffs essentially were advancing the proposition that SSM owed a “social duty” to them, and to the public at large. However, the scope of a good Samaritan’s duty is measured by the scope of his or her undertaking. Section 324A does not impose any “social,” “implied” or “derivative” duty. Rather, Section 324A imposes liability, reaching to third persons, upon a party’s breach of a specifically undertaken duty. If a defendant did not undertake to perform a specified task, it cannot be held liable under Section 324A for failing to perform that task.
The medical monitoring claim against the engineers was dismissed.