A federal court has rejected a proposed class of plaintiffs who alleged that they purchased deceptively labeled lipstick and foundation, in part because of an inability to show class-wide damages. See Algarin v. Maybelline, LLC, No. 12-03000 (S.D. Cal., 5/12/14).
Maybelline manufactures, markets, sells, and distributes SuperStay 24HR Lipcolor, a line of lipcolors, and SuperStay 24HR Makeup, a line of skin foundations, Plaintiffs alleged these products were marketed to provide "all day comfort,” that withstands “heat, sweat, and humidity,” but allegedly do not. Plaintiffs alleged they paid a price premium because of the company's claims. On behalf of a proposed California class of consumers who bought the SuperStay products, they asserted claims under the California Unfair Competition Law and Consumers Legal Remedies Act.
In assessing the motion for class certification, the court found that there were issues with the proposed class definition. Plaintiffs defined the class as: “[a]ll California consumers who purchased SuperStay 24HR Lipcolor and/or SuperStay 24HR Makeup for personal use." Given the number of differences between the two products, including but not limited to, pricing differences, claims differences, labeling differences, and ultimately merits differences, the Court questioned whether creating sub-classes would be needed. Beyond that, though not explicitly stated in Rule 23, courts have held that the class must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable before a class action may proceed. See Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural Beverage Co., 268 F.R.D. 365, 376 (N.D. Cal. 2010) . A class is sufficiently defined and ascertainable if, among other things, it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a member. See O’Connor v. Boeing N. American, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 319 (C.D. Cal. 1998). It must be administratively feasible to determine whether a particular person is a class member as an identifiable class exists if its members can be ascertained by reference to objective criteria, but not if membership is contingent on a prospective member’s state of mind. While here the class definition seemed ascertainable in the sense that class membership might be determined based on an objective criterion -- whether members purchased either the SuperStay lipcolor of the SuperStay makeup -- Plaintiffs failed to provide a reliable method of determining who the actual members of the class were. So it was not ascertainable in the sense that members could actually ever be determined. Plaintiffs failed to show how it was “administratively feasibile" to determine whether a particular person was a class member. The court correctly noted that this inquiry overlaps with the “manageability” prong of Rule 23(b)(3).
Specifically, Maybelline argued that purchasers were unlikely to have documentary proof of purchase of products like these years later, and Maybelline does not maintain a purchaser list or other identifying method. In such a situation, the Court and the parties would necessarily rely on class members to self-identify. There are a number of cases that stand for the proposition that where a court has no way to verify if a purchaser is actually a class member, class certification may be improper. See e.g., Red, 2012 WL 8019257, at *4; Hodes v. Int’l Foods, 2009 WL 2424214, at
*4 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2009). Here, the relevant purchase was not a memorable “big ticket” item, but rather small-ticket items that cost around $10.00; it was extremely unlikely the average purchaser would even remember she purchased the specific SuperStay products versus a competitor product.
The court also observed that expert evidence shows that materiality and reliance varied from consumer to consumer, such that these elements were not an issue subject to common proof. Under the claims alleged, a representation is considered material if it induced the consumer to alter his position to his detriment. If the issue of materiality or reliance is a matter that would vary from consumer to consumer, the issue is not subject to common proof, and the action is properly not certified as a class action. Maybelline introduced evidence of who the reasonable consumer in the target audience was and what drives her in making purchasing decisions. With cosmetics such as the ones at issue here, customers can readily discern how well they work and whether they lived up to the claimed representations. Accordingly, repeat purchasers can not be considered injured in the manner proposed by Plaintiffs. A repeat purchase indicates satisfaction. The evidence suggested that duration was not the only motivating factor in making the purchases; actual duration expectations varied widely among purchasers; and very few consumers actually read the package the way plaintiffs' counsel did and thus could have been “injured” in the manner alleged by Plaintiffs.
This undermined both the commonality and the typicality prerequisites. Based upon the evidence presented, the named Plaintiffs’ reliance on the alleged misrepresentations was not typical of other class members.
Under Rule 23(b)(2), the court concluded that the injunctive relief requested by the plaintiffs wasn't appropriate for the class as a whole. Class members who bought the cosmetics and used them became well aware of the realities of the products, and wouldn't benefit from the relief sought.
Under Rule 23(b)(3), the Plaintiffs sought individual monetized relief that would require an assessment of each class member's claim based on purchase history. Given the number of individual purchasing inquiries, as well as the evidence showing materiality and reliance varied from consumer to consumer, it was evident that common issues did not predominate. As is standard, Plaintiffs proposed the “price premium” method of determining class-wide damages, contending that their damage theory was “simple." It was not obvious to the Court, however, that the alleged 24 hour/no transfer claim commanded the alleged premium of $1.00-$3.00. Indeed, that was pure speculation on the part of Plaintiffs. Pricing could have been equally impacted by a higher quality of ingredients, the selection of colors offered, or the unique costs Maybelline expended in the research and development of these products. Plaintiffs’ method of using comparable products from other sellers is inconsistent with the law. To establish that any difference in price was attributed to the alleged misrepresentation, the Court needed to compare a product, exactly the same but without the challenged marketing claim. Such a task was nearly impossible as no two products are completely identical.
Moreover, Maybelline did not sell retail and does not set retail prices. Establishing a higher price for a comparable product would be difficult where prices in the retail market differ and are affected by the nature and location of the outlet in which they are sold and/or the use of promotions and coupons. The Court could not simply assume that all retailers throughout California purchase and sell the products at one price.
Finally, the existence of an economic injury was also not a common question as many purchasers were satisfied with the products. Economic injury is not a common question when many purchasers find the class products were worth the amount paid and fully satisfied.
Class motion denied.