Challenge to Federal-State Court Coordination Overture Prompts Response

One of the challenges of our system of federalism, and dual jurisdiction between state and federal courts, is the coordination of related cases pending in the two systems.  Perhaps nowhere does this happen more regularly than in the realm of mass torts.  Federal cases may be coordinated in an MDL, and several states, such as New Jersey, have a procedure to centralize mass tort filings in their state court system. See Hermann, et al. Statewide Coordinated Proceedings (2d ed. West 2004). But coordination between the state and federal level has been more difficult, more informal, more experimental. That is, state and federal judges, faced with the lack of a comprehensive statutory scheme, have undertaken innovative efforts to coordinate parallel or related litigation so as to try to reduce the costs, delays, and duplication of effort that can stem from such dispersed litigation. State judges, for example, can bring additional resources that might enable an MDL transferee court to implement a nationwide discovery plan or a coordinated national calendar

Recently, plaintiffs in state court cases in the Actos litigation sent the Actos federal MDL court a letter complaining that the judge improperly "intervened" by discussing the litigation "ex parte" with the state court judge.  The plaintiffs asserted that the federal court persuaded the state court judge to rule in a certain fashion on scheduling issues, including the time for discovery and trial dates. Plaintiffs complained that such "intervention" would prevent them from properly litigating their cases; violated the important policy of comity (citing the Anti-Injunction Act); and raised "objectivity" concerns.  Plaintiffs requested the federal court refrain from such communications in the future with any state court judges handling Actos cases, citing the Canons of Judicial Ethics.  Finally, the letter asked that plaintiffs further be heard on this issue at an upcoming MDL hearing.

At first blush, this seemed like an over-reaction by plaintiffs, and perhaps an attempt to intimidate the court into not doing what seems like a perfectly acceptable thing, informally coordinating litigation which raises similar issues, involves many of the same counsel, and likely will implicate many of the same discovery requests, fact and expert witnesses. We leave it to the loyal readers of MassTortDefense to decide for themselves about the tone of this letter.

So how did the federal court react? Judge Doherty is overseeing the federal multidistrict litigation, In re: Actos (Pioglitazone) Products Liability Litigation (MDL-2299). Her reaction came in the form of a "Memorandum Response." The court read the original letter as possibly alleging improper and unethical conduct by both the federal and state court judges, and doing so by making "completely specious" arguments. On the merits, the court began by noting that the Manual for Complex Litigation recommends cooperation and coordination among federal and state court judges in these mass tort contexts.  So does the state court-focused manual, Managing Mass Tort Cases: A Resource for State Court Judges, published by the Conference of Chief Justices. The important notion of comity was respected because the communication from the MDL court was merely an invitation asking whether state courts might see any benefit in talking about the litigation posture. An invitation to chat is not an "intervention." And any communications were in that same spirit.

The court's memorandum turned to the MDL schedule, its internal logic and consistency, and the ample opportunity all parties had to comment on and object to any of its provisions. The court then points out, logically, that an improper ex parte conversation involves a communication between the court and one , but not all parties -- not a conversation between two independent judges.

The court than labeled a "cautionary tale" those cases that warn attorneys against unsubstantiated allegations that bring the judiciary into disrepute. Finally, the court noted that the letter inaccurately cites the Code of Judicial Conduct. The canons clearly do not prohibit a judge from consulting with other judges to aid the judge in carrying out his or her responsibilities.

The court gave the authors the benefit of the doubt, deciding ultimately to view the letter as over-zealous, ill-advised, poorly thought out, regrettable hyperbole, and empty rhetoric, as opposed to something more troubling.   An interesting read for all our readers, especially those with MDL practices.

 

New Edition of Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence

The National Research Council and Federal Judicial center last week released the new edition of the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence. Readers of MassTortDefense know   about this manual as a guide for judges searching for effective and fair ways to handle science-based issues, including assessing expert testimony. The Supreme Court has made clear that the law imposes on trial judges the duty, with respect to scientific evidence, to become evidentiary gatekeepers. The judge, without interfering with the jury’s role as trier of fact, must determine
whether purported scientific evidence is “reliable” and will “assist the trier of fact,” thereby keeping from juries testimony that  lacks the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.

The manual is intended to assist judges in managing cases involving complex scientific and technical evidence by describing the basic tenets of key scientific fields from which legal evidence is typically derived and providing examples of cases in which that evidence has been used. As the introduction to the new edition notes, the search is not a search for scientific precision. Courts cannot hope to investigate all the subtleties that characterize good scientific work. A judge is not a scientist, and a courtroom is not a scientific laboratory. But the objective is to seek legal decisions that fall within the boundaries of scientifically sound knowledge.

The Manual includes general chapters such as on "The Admissibility of Expert Testimony" and "How Science Works," and specific chapters on (of interest to our readers) Exposure Science,  Epidemiology, and Toxicology, and new chapters on Neuroscience, and Mental Health Evidence. The authors note the new edition has a focus on two critical topics that judges frequently confront, causation and expert bias.

The new edition was produced by a committee of judges, scientific experts, attorneys and academics. Bu it will be interesting to see if readers, after getting a chance to review it, will find that this version inappropriately undermines the Daubert guidelines enunciated by the Supreme Court and overemphasizes the "discretion" of trial judges to "manage" their dockets despite the meaning of the Federal Rules of Evidence.