A federal court recently rejected a proposed medical monitoring class action brought by alleged Pepsi drinkers. The case reminds readers of the importance of the causation element of medical monitoring claims, even though plaintiffs don't need to allege traditional personal injury. See Riva v. Pepsico, Inc., No. C-14-2929 EMC, 2015 WL 993350 (N.D. Cal., 3/4/15).
Plaintiffs alleged that two of defendant's beverages contained levels of a chemical, 4–MeI, that caused them to experience an “increased risk of cancer,” specifically bronchioloalveolar cancer. Plaintiffs sought medical monitoring as a remedy; specifically, seeking an order requiring Pepsi to establish a “fund from which those individual class members can seek monetary recovery for the costs of actual or anticipated medical monitoring expenses incurred by them.” Plaintiffs alleged that outcomes in bronchioloalveolar cancer show a clinically significant benefit from early evaluation, detection, and diagnosis.
California is one of the few states that recognizes a claim for medical monitoring. “In the context of a toxic exposure action, a claim for medical monitoring seeks to recover the cost of future periodic medical examinations intended to facilitate early detection and treatment of disease caused by a plaintiff’s exposure to toxic substances.” Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal.4th 965, 1004–05, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 863 P.2d 795 (1993). In Potter, the California Supreme Court identified five factors in determining the reasonableness and necessity of monitoring:
(1) the significance and extent of the plaintiff’s exposure to chemicals;
(2) the toxicity of the chemicals;
(3) the relative increase in the chance of onset of disease in the exposed plaintiff as a result of the exposure, when compared to
(a) the plaintiff’s chances of developing the disease had he or she not been exposed, and
(b) the chances of the members of the public at large of developing the disease;
(4) the seriousness of the disease for which the plaintiff is at risk; and
(5) the clinical value of early detection and diagnosis.
Based on such factors, the trier of fact decides, “on the basis of competent medical testimony, whether and to what extent the particular plaintiff’s exposure to toxic chemicals in a given situation justifies future periodic medical monitoring.” Id.
Defendant attacked the medical monitoring claim under Rule 12(b)(6), particularly as to the Potter factors related to whether medical monitoring is reasonable and necessary. Accordingly, the Court examined the allegations related to these critical Potter factors: plaintiff’s exposure to chemicals; the toxicity of the chemicals; and the relative increase in the chance of onset of disease in the exposed plaintiff as a result of the exposure, when compared to (a) the plaintiff’s chances of developing the disease had he or she not been exposed, and (b) the chances of the members of the public at large of developing the disease.
To demonstrate the proximate causation element of the claim, a plaintiff seeking medical monitoring must. among other things, show the significance of her exposure to the toxic chemical. Potter, 6 Cal.4th at 1009, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 863 P.2d 795; see also Abuan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329, 335 (9th Cir.1993) (applying comparable Guam law on medical monitoring). The California Supreme Court has explained, “[e]vidence of exposure alone cannot support a finding that medical monitoring is ... necessary.” Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal.4th at 1108–09, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 63 P.3d 913. A plaintiff must demonstrate sufficient severity of exposure (its significance and extent) and that “the need for future monitoring is a reasonably certain consequence of [the] toxic exposure” Id. at 1109, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 63 P.3d 913 (citation omitted).
In this case, Plaintiffs alleged that the chemical had been found to cause lung tumors in laboratory animals -- at a daily dose thousands of times higher than the amount in soda. Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all persons who purchased Diet Pepsi or Pepsi One within a four-year period, regardless of consumption amount. What was missing was any allegation of what the significance of this unspecified exposure to the chemical may be; they did not allege what threshold level of exposure allegedly created the increased risk.
Thus, there was insufficient information about the significance and extent of exposure of the class to make the necessary ultimate showing that “the need for future monitoring is a reasonably certain consequence of [the] toxic exposure” Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal.4th at 1109, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 63 P.3d 913. They simply failed to demonstrate a credible risk of bronchioloalveolar cancer resulting from the human consumption of cola products at the levels alleged by the named plaintiffs. In fact, if anything, the specific scientific finding incorporated into the Complalnt from the mice study was that the amounts of 4–MeI ingested in cola products “may not be significant.”
The Court also found that Plaintiffs had not sufficiently pled their injury or shown the toxicity of 4–MeI. It was not enough thatt 4–MeI is on the Proposition 65 list of known carcinogens, that a toxicologist has stated that there is “no safe level of 4–MeI,” and that advocacy groups have called for the FDA to ban 4–MeI. The full picture was that “caramel coloring” (the manufacturing of which allegedly produces 4–MEI as a byproduct) is “generally recognized as safe” when used in accordance with good manufacturing practice and as a food color additive. Under the FDCA, the inclusion of “caramel color” as a “color additive” means that the FDA has determined that caramel coloring has not been found “to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal.” 21 U.S.C. § 379e(b)(5)(B).
So while Plaintiffs adequately pled that 4–MeI is toxic and is, generally speaking, a carcinogen—i.e., that 4–MeI is capable of causing cancer, they had not adequately pled their specific theory of injury—an increased risk for bronchioloalveolar cancer sufficient to warrant medical monitoring—“above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiffs are not mice, and there was nothing in the Complaint, or the studies incorporated by reference, to suggest that 4–MeI causes this specific form of lung cancer in humans. The same mouse study found no increased cancer in rats and discussed a “species difference” identified in previous studies in terms of how various species absorb, distribute, metabolize, and excrete this very chemical. So this study did not lead to a plausible inference that these Plaintiffs are at increased risk of the specific lung cancer for which they request screening.
In short, the Plaintiffs failed to plead factual content to show they had been injured due to a “significant” increase in their risk of lung cancer sufficient to justify medical testing in the absence of any symptoms or present injury. See Potter, 6 Cal.4th at 1008–09, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 863 P.2d 795. The only factual content supporting the allegation of increased risk of lung cancer came from scientific studies, which had no demonstrable bearing on cancer toxicity for humans at the consumption levels alleged in the case at bar.
A plaintiff seeking medical monitoring must show a need for “specific monitoring beyond that which an individual should pursue as a matter of general good sense and foresight.” Potter, 6 Cal.4th at 1009, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 863 P.2d 795. In this case, Plaintiffs sought CT scans of their lungs and molecular screening for lung cancer. Lung scans are not needed to remedy injury absent a credible showing that 4–MeI causes this lung cancer in humans.
The Court took the Prop 65 argument head on. Proposition 65 is broad; its listing embraces “ substances listed as human or animal carcinogens. In other words, “the Proposition 65 list includes chemicals that are known to cause cancer in animals, even though it has not been definitively established that the chemicals will cause cancer in humans.” Baxter Healthcare, 120 Cal.App.4th at 352, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 430. Furthermore, listing under Proposition 65 only requires one excess case of cancer in an exposed population of 100,000, assuming lifetime exposure at the level in question. Because the burden on a defendant to fund medical screening for thousands, potentially millions, of people is so substantial, the Potter factors serve a critical gatekeeping function, regulating a potential flood of costly litigation; Potter requires a higher level of proof of health risk than that required for inclusion of a substance on the Proposition 65 list.
Finally, the Court addressed the increased risk above background, and other possible sources of exposure. There can be many possible “causes,” indeed, an infinite number of circumstances which can produce an injury or disease. A possible cause only becomes “probable” when, in the absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action. This is the outer limit of inference upon which an issue may be submitted to the jury. As a result, under California personal injury law the mere possibility of causing cancer alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case.
The Court said that this concept of causation inheres in the Potter test for the reasonableness of medical monitoring; the trier of fact considers, among other factors, “the relative increase in the chance of onset of disease in the exposed plaintiff as a result of the exposure, when compared to (a) the plaintiff’s chances of developing the disease had he or she not been exposed, and (b) the chances of the members of the public at large of developing the disease.” Potter, 6 Cal.4th at 1009, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 863 P.2d 795. Consistent with this approach, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed a grant of summary judgment where plaintiffs seeking medical monitoring failed to introduce facts regarding the “quantitative (or even qualitative) increased risk to individuals.” Abuan, 3 F.3d at 335.
The Complaint admitted that there are many sources of consumption of 4–MeI, including “baked goods, confectionary, extruded breakfast cereals, instantaneous soups, and dark beers” as well as “soy sauce and coffee.” The many alternative sources of 4–MeI was problematic to the establishment of any causation between the Pepsi products at issue and the Plaintiffs’ alleged consumption of 4–MeI “at or above certain threshold levels” (whatever those threshold levels, if any, may be). The many sources of 4–MeI prevented these Plaintiffs from satisfying the third Potter factor.
Where the pleadings reveal so many commonly consumed foods with similar levels of a chemicaI, it is implausible to conclude that any alleged increased risk of cancer is “more likely than not” caused by drinking/using one product, said the Court. As a result, the Plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (“something beyond the mere possibility of loss causation must be alleged”).