Mass Tort Defense : Mass Tort Defense Lawyer & Attorney : Sean P. Wajert : Dechert Law Firm : Products Liability, Class Actions, Pharmaceutical Litigation

Just about a year ago, we posted about an interesting device case in which the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois, in an opinion by Chief Judge Michael P. McCuskey, found inadmissible plaintiff's expert witness testimony that his knee implant failed due to alleged oxidation caused by the method Zimmer used to sterilize the product. Fuesting v. Zimmer Inc., 2009 WL 174163 (C.D. Ill., 1/26/09).

Last week  the federal appeals court affirmed the judgment for the knee implant maker.  Fuesting v. Zimmer Inc., 2010 WL 271728 (7th Cir. 1/25/10).  Fuesting had alleged he received the Zimmer-made implant in 1994. In 2001, he began experiencing pain in the knee, and his doctor removed the prosthesis in November of that year. Fuesting sued, alleging that Zimmer's sterilization of the prosthesis by gamma irradiation in air (GIA) rendered it defective. At trial, his expert witness, Dr. Pugh, testified that GIA caused the prosthesis to oxidize and delaminate, resulting in premature failure. A jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, but the Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment after finding that Pugh's testimony did not meet the requirements for admissibility of expert testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and the standards set forth in Daubert.

On remand, Fuesting proffered the testimony of a second expert witness, Dr. Rose. But the trial court found that Dr. Rose had not bridged the analytical gap between accepted principles and his complex conclusions. He had not, and could not, show that the prosthesis failed because of the sterilization method used. The expert testimony as to defect also failed.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit stated that Dr. Rose's testimony did not show that his theory that these knee implants oxidize “in vivo” had sufficient acceptance in the scientific community.  He failed to point to any peer reviewed studies that discuss the oxidation rates of this type of implant in vivo.  Dr. Rose failed to cite any articles or studies that he or any one else conducted regarding how one can discern whether the alleged oxidation occurred before or after implantation.  Dr. Rose also did not rule out possible alternative methods of causation.  Nor did he explain how the device's oxidation caused the device to fail, as the mere presence of oxidation does not prove that the oxidation caused the device to malfunction.

Dr. Rose also failed to “bridge the analytical gap” between the accepted fact that GIA sterilization causes at least some amount of oxidation and his ultimate conclusion that Fuesting's knee implant in particular failed because GIA, rather than another sterilization method, was used. Last, Dr. Rose failed to show that better sterilization alternatives existed in 1991. He concluded, in one sentence of his report, and without any support, that the industry standard was to sterilize implants in an inert gas instead of air. In fact, no manufacturer at that time employed any of  the proffered methods, and Dr. Rose cited no contemporary articles counseling the use of such methods.  For all these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Rose's testimony.


 

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Not long ago we blogged about the economic loss rule, noting that the doctrine had some variants among the states.  Recently, the South Carolina Supreme Court pulled back on an exception to the economic loss rule, concluding that its 2008 opinion expanding the ability to recover in tort for purely economic damages had been wrongly decided. Sapp v. Ford Motor Co., 2009 WL 4893648 (S.C., 12/21/09). Very refreshing to see a court recognize an issue quickly, and act promptly to correct the error.

Economic loss generally refers to damages that occur through the loss of the value or use of the goods sold or the cost of repair, when there has been no claim of personal injury or damage to property other than the product. The economic loss doctrine has held that such damages, a product injuring itself in essence, is a claim about a breach of the commercial relationship, and thus must be brought in contract/warranty, and not a tort claim sounding in negligence or strict liability. Most states have adopted some form of the economic loss rule, although with some variation in detail. Some carve out exceptions, and in South Carolina there has long been an exception for economic damage to a residence. The reasoning was that a home is often an individual's largest investment and different in kind from other manufactured goods. The courts also looked at the unequal bargaining power between builders and home purchasers.

But in Colleton Preparatory Academy Inc. v. Hoover Universal Inc., 379 S.C. 181, 666 S.E.2d 247 (S.C. 2008), the court seemed to expand the exception even farther, into commercial property.  In Colleton Prep, which concerned allegedly defective materials used in constructing a school building, the state court held that a tort suit could go forward even where only the product itself is damaged, if there is also a clear, serious and unreasonable risk of injury or death, as was the case in a school. The defense bar termed this a very surprising opinion, because it extended the seemingly narrow exception so far that it threatened to swallow the rule, appearing to create tort liability for mere potential harm or risk.

In Sapp, actually two cases consolidated for appeal, plaintiffs sued over allegedly defective cruise-control systems on Ford Motor Co. F-150 trucks, which allegedly caused fires. The lower courts dismissed the claims, saying that under the economic loss doctrine, tort recovery was not available because the damage was only to the allegedly defective products themselves. At oral argument on plaintiffs' appeal, they argued the new expanded exception, suggesting the truck fire created that clear and serious risk of injury. 

The supreme court seemed to recognize the problems it had created. The court recognized that
the exception for residences was a very narrow one.  And the court clarified it  no intention of the exception extending beyond residential real estate construction and into commercial real estate construction. "Such a progression was in error and we now correct that expansion. Much less did we intend the exception to the economic loss rule to be applied well beyond the scope of real estate construction in an ordinary products liability claim.” Accordingly, the court overruled Colleton Prep to the extent it could be read to expand the narrow exception to the economic loss rule beyond the residential builder context.

In South Carolina, as in many states, the purpose of the economic loss rule is to define the line between recovery in tort and recovery in contract. In the context of products liability law, when a defective product only damages itself, the only concrete and measurable damages are the diminution in the value of the product, cost of repair, and consequential damages resulting from the product's failure. Stated differently, the consumer has only suffered an economic loss. When only damage is to the product itself, what has happened is the consumer's expectations have not been met, and he has lost the benefit of the bargain. Accordingly, where a product damages only itself, tort law provides no remedy and the action lies in contract; but when personal injury or other property damage occurs, a tort remedy may be appropriate.  The traditional economic loss rule provides a more stable framework and results in a more just and predictable outcome in product liability cases.

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A federal court has dismissed a case against Ford Motor Co. brought on behalf of a minor who was severely hurt when she was struck by a Ford pickup truck while riding her bike.  The court concluded that plaintiff offered insufficient evidence that the alleged defect in the truck (absence of front-wheel anti-lock brakes) caused the accident and thus the ensuing injuries. BancFirst v. Ford Motor Co., 2009 WL 5168342 (W.D.Okla. 12/21/09). 

A seven-year-old rode her bicycle into the path of an oncoming Ford F150 pickup truck driven by Brandon Moore. Although he took evasive action, Moore was unable to avoid hitting the child, who was severely injured as a result of the impact. Plaintiff alleged that the truck wheels locked and the truck began to rotate in a counter-clockwise direction. The truck slid on wet pavement through the intersection, and the child was hit by the right rear corner of the truck as it passed through the inside lane.  Plaintiff brought an action against the manufacturer of the truck, Ford Motor Company, alleging that the truck was unreasonably dangerous because it lacked front-wheel anti-lock brakes (“ABS”).  Ford moved for summary judgment.

Under either a strict liability or negligence theory, plaintiff must show that the lack of front-wheel anti-lock brakes on the F-150 truck caused the accident. In support of its contention that the failure to equip Moore’s truck with ABS on all four wheels caused the accident, plaintiff offered the opinion of William Medcalf, a registered professional engineer. During his deposition, plaintiff’s expert conceded that he could not testify to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty that the alleged defect – lack of all-wheel ABS – caused the accident in this case. Expert testimony in this regard was crucial to plaintiff’s case as the efficacy and functionality of anti-lock braking systems are not within the understanding of ordinary jurors.

So far, so good. A basic failure of an expert to perform at deposition the way the plaintiff probably hoped he would.  But its what happened next that makes the case more useful.

The plaintiff offered a later affidavit from the same expert, but it was ignored because it was based on the same data he had when he gave his first opinion.  Readers of MassTortDefense may be interested in the discussion of another tactic, as the expert attempted to change his previous testimony to avoid summary judgment, through an errata sheet to his deposition, the court said. While Rule 30(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits "corrections" to deposition transcripts, it does not permit wholesale changes to sworn testimony. Coleman v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 997 F.Supp. 1197, 1205 (D. Ariz.1998) (discrediting deposition testimony directly contradicted by errata sheet); S.E.C. v. Parkersburg Wireless, L.L. C., 156 F.R.D. 529, 535 (D.D.C. 1994) (noting trend in which courts do not allow a party “to make any substantive change she so desires” in deposition testimony); Rios v. Bigler, 847 F.Supp. 1538, 1546-47 (D. Kan.1994) (court will consider only those changes which clarify the deposition, and not those which materially alter it); Greenway v. International Paper Co., 144 F.R.D. 322, 325 (W.D. La. 1992) (suppressing deponent's attempt to rewrite material answers given in deposition); Barlow v.. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 111 F.R.D. 404, 406 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (refusing to consider changes to deposition that were made in bad faith).

The changes here were not a clarification; they were substantive changes diametrically opposed to the answers given during the deposition, said the court. Moreover, although Medcalf stated that his new answers were just clarifications to the record, there was no indication that he was confused during the deposition. That the expert treated the deposition like a "take home examination" was clear to the court not only from his proposed changes, but also from the timing of the errata sheet, which appeared only after Ford moved for summary judgment.

Plaintiff had no competent evidence that the accident would not have occurred had Moore’s truck been equipped with four-wheel ABS. It thus had no evidence that the alleged defect caused the accident and the subsequent injuries to plaintiff.  And the last minute attempts to fix that problem were of no avail. Defendant was therefore entitled to summary judgment in its favor. 

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Defendants were granted summary judgment in a case in which the parents of a young woman alleged her death was caused by the infusion treatment Remicade.  Mack v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., 2009 WL 4342513 (D. Md. 11/24/09).  The lesson here for defendants is to put plaintiffs to their proof on every element of a claim.

Crystal Ann Mack was diagnosed with a severe form of Crohn's disease, an inflammatory disease affecting the gastrointestinal tract. In the autumn of 2006, Ms. Mack was hospitalized on two occasions and ultimately diagnosed with anemia, vomiting, weight loss, and various other symptoms. Her treating physician recommended that Ms. Mack undergo Remicade treatments. She received four infusions, in accordance with the medication's dosing instructions. Later, Mack fell unconscious in her home and died. Mack's parents sued three defendants, the drug makers and the distributor, alleging that Mack died of a cardiac arrhythmia that was proximately caused by Remicade.

The defendants sought summary judgment.  Analyzing the product liability claims first, the court concluded that plaintiffs' claims cannot survive summary judgment because they did not establish an issue of fact on whether Remicade is a defective product. Plaintiffs made great efforts to prove specific and general causation, but they made no adequate showing with respect to the issue of defect. Because a showing of defect is an independent prerequisite for a products liability claim, the court didn't even feel the need not address whether plaintiffs satisfied their burden on the issue of causation.

In order to recover on a product defect claim, under the applicable state law, a plaintiff must prove that a defect which renders the product unreasonably dangerous might arise from the design of the product, a deficiency in its manufacture, or from the absence or inadequacy of any instructions or warnings as to its safe and appropriate use. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not assert a failure-to-warn theory.

Under Maryland law, courts may apply both the “risk/utility” test and the “consumer expectation” test when evaluating the efficacy of design defect claims. The “risk/utility” test involves an assessment of “whether the benefits of a product outweigh the dangers of its design.”  Alternatively, a drug could be deemed unreasonably dangerous if it is “dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. Here, plaintiffs merely cited the legal standards for alleging and proving defect. 

Moreover, plaintiffs failed to present expert testimony on the issue of defect.  The testimony of the doctors largely focused on the issue of causation, and they failed to explain how Remicade was unreasonably dangerous. This shortcoming was especially damaging to plaintiffs' claims, because the issue of defect in this case involved technical medical questions beyond the common knowledge of laypersons.

Nor was there sufficient circumstantial evidence of defect. Plaintiffs' counsel proffered several miscellaneous documents, including internal corporate memoranda and correspondence that referred to the exhibited side effects of Remicade. However, such documents did not militate for the submission of the defect issue to a jury. The fact that a drug may exhibit certain adverse side effects does not, by itself, create an issue of material fact on whether the drug is unreasonably dangerous. The courts have recognized that all drugs involve risks of adverse side effects in those who take them.  In the face of FDA approval, plaintiffs would need to provide a much greater evidentiary showing to establish that the medication's attendant risks outweigh its benefits, the necessary showing under the “risk/utility” test.

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A federal court has granted a software maker summary judgment in a case arising from the use of "spyware."  The plaintiff failed to convince the court that product liability claims were proper against the company who made the software the plaintiff's former wife allegedly targeted him with.  Hayes v. SpectorSoft Corp., 2009 WL 3713284 (E.D.Tenn. 11/3/09).

Plaintiff alleged that his former wife purchased software, including one called the “Spector Professional Edition for Windows," and installed it on his computer.  Plaintiff contends that following the installation of these software programs, the software recorded all his chat conversations, instant messages, e-mails sent and received, and the websites visited by plaintiff whenever he used his laptop computer, and re-transmitted such electronic communication to her (or a sister). SpectorSoft's software is apparently primarily used by parents and employers to monitor Internet use by children and employees.

The parties disputed whether SpectorSoft knew of the illegal use of the SpectorSoft software to gain access to plaintiff's private laptop communications. Plaintiff alleged that SpectorSoft knew or should have known about such usage. He thus asserted several causes of action (including negligence) against SpectorSoft for its alleged role in allowing his personal computer usage to be captured--  and that defendant  “aided and abetted” in the violation of his rights.

The court concluded first that plaintiff had not created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether SpectorSoft aided and abetted the alleged invasion of his privacy. There was no evidence that SpectorSoft took an affirmative act that encouraged the women to violate plaintiff's rights. In fact, SpectorSoft attempted to protect the rights of persons like plaintiff by requiring purchasers to accept its licensing terms prior to being allowed to install its software (which prohibited this kind of use). There was similarly no evidence that SpectorSoft knew anything about how the women were using its software. While some retailers marketed SpectorSoft's products to spouses concerned about adultery, SpectorSoft itself did not market its product for such uses, and it provided its users with a licensing agreement that it had reason to believe was valid. Furthermore, said  the court, even a broad-based marketing campaign does not provide the requisite affirmative act of specific encouragement or assistance to the individuals at issue in this case.

Turning to the claim under the state Products Liability Act , a seller of a consumer product may be liable for “injury to a person or property caused by the product” if “the product is determined to be in a defective condition or unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the control of the manufacturer or seller.”  The court did not reach the issue whether software constitutes a “product” under the statute (nor the "misuse" issue which springs to mind), because the  Act defines a “product liability action” as one brought “for or on account of personal injury, death or property damage."  But plaintiff cited to no Tennessee authority suggesting that a products liability claim can be brought for emotional injuries alone, unaccompanied by some sort of physical injury or actual damage to property. Plaintiff did not allege in his Complaint that the alleged invasion of his privacy actually damaged his property, such as his computer or his business.

Similarly, plaintiff failed to provide appropriate legal support for his general negligence claim. Tennessee law does recognize a claim for general emotional distress caused by the negligent actions of another in the form of a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. See Eskin v. Bartee, 262 S.W.3d 727, 733 (Tenn.Sup.Ct.2008). But the Tennessee Supreme Court has established that where a case is purely one for emotional injury unaccompanied by damages for physical injury or other damages, the plaintiff must present material evidence as to each of the five elements of general negligence --duty, breach of duty, injury or loss, causation in fact, and proximate or legal, cause -- and, in order to guard against trivial or fraudulent actions, the law ought to provide recovery only for “serious” or “severe” emotional injury. 

On the duty element, the general duty of care does not include an affirmative duty to act for the protection of another, unless the defendant stands in some special relationship to either the person who is the source of the danger, or to the person who is foreseeably at risk from the danger.  There is no precedent for the proposition that a manufacturer of spyware software owes a duty to avoid emotional injury to the victim of the misuse of that software in violation of the software's licensing agreement. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate legal support for the proposition that SpectorSoft had a special relationship or that SpectorSoft somehow assumed a duty of care towards plaintiff.

Finally, plaintiff failed to present evidence of his severe or serious emotional distress. Without such evidence of severe emotional distress, plaintiff's negligence claim that asserts only garden variety anxiety and mental distress as damages must be dismissed. 

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The Iowa Supreme Court last week issued an interesting decision clarifying the subsequent remedial measure doctrine in that jurisdiction, and offering some good general notions. Scott v. Dutton-Lainson Co., 2009 WL 3415937 (Iowa 10/23/09).

A little background.  Readers of MassTort Defense know that despite the nostalgic effort of some courts to try to maintain a bright line between strict liability and negligence claims, it is pure semantics to try to confine certain product defect claims to a "strict" regime.  Specifically, failure to warn claims and design defect claims (as opposed to manufacturing defect claims) have been largely recognized as sounding, at least in part, in negligence.  In the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, the standards for design defect and failure-to-warn claims require consideration of reasonableness and therefore incorporate negligence principles.

Beyond the articulation of the causes of action, the classification of the claims has other potential impact in a products liability claim, such as in this case. Plaintiff worked for a boat dealership and suffered an injured foot when the jack on a boat trailer collapsed.  Plaintiff offered a design defect theory, that the jack's pin should have been longer, allowing users to better see whether the pin was engaged. (A competitor allegedly made a longer pin.)  Below, plaintiff sought to introduce three bits of testimony regarding defendant's alleged subsequent changes to the pin tooling, which lengthened it and thus allowed it to reach further into the pin hole.  The first was deposition testimony from a company officer concerning changing the tooling.  Second was a deposition of a witness who reportedly heard a company official say the pin was lengthened as a result of plaintiff's accident. The third was proposed testimony that the redesign allowed the pin to move further into the hole.

As in some states, Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.407 excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence or culpable conduct, but not in strict liability claims.  Plaintiff, of course, argued that the proposed testimony was for his strict liability claims.  The trial court excluded the evidence at trial, which resulted in a defense verdict.

The state supreme court held that design defect and failure-to-warn claims sound in negligence, rather than strict liability.  Thus, the lower court had been correct to exclude evidence of the subsequent measures at the trial. Evidence of subsequent remedial measures, which a party seeks to introduce in an action based on a design defect claim, a failure to warn claim, or a breach of warranty claim brought under either theory, is not categorically exempt from exclusion under rule 5.407, because these claims are not strict liability claims. Instead, trial courts must analyze the reason a party seeks to admit such evidence. According to rule 5.407, evidence of subsequent remedial measures is not admissible to show negligence or culpable conduct. Such evidence is admissible to show “ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.407.

The court found that the exceptions in the rule adequately accommodate a plaintiff's burden to prove a reasonable alternative design.  A plaintiff has the opportunity to introduce evidence of subsequent remedial measures if the defendant disputes the feasibility of a suggested alternative design.

The court found that important policy reasons, including the need to avoid deterring individuals from making improvements or repairs after an accident, supported the exclusion. Plaintiffs, and misguided academics, often assert that manufacturers will choose to make improvements to a product even if those improvements are admissible because the producer would otherwise risk litigation and negative publicity.  But there is a substantial body of criticism of that notion, which overstates the relevance of subsequent remedial measures, appears to have an over-focus on mass product producers (when the rule applies to everyone), and invites confusion of the jury, both by diverting its attention from whether the product was defective at the relevant time to what was done later, and by facilitating, in the minds of jurors, an inappropriate equation between subsequent design modification and an admission of a prior defective design.  This plaintiff's argument premises its conclusions concerning hypothetical manufacturer conduct upon the assumption that the product at issue is in fact defective, overlooking the situation where the product is not defective but could have been, and may be later, improved.

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As due process considerations have taken their more appropriate place in the law of punitive damages, see BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), trial courts have struggled with the intersection of traditional product liability law and new rules on evidence necessitated by such due process concerns. 

For example, plaintiffs frequently seek to use evidence of other allegedly similar conduct and allegedly substantially similar accidents, injuries, incidents for liability related issues such as notice and defect.  In Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057 (2008), however, the Court confirmed a significant constitutional principle limiting punitive damages awards: the Due Process Clause prohibits juries from basing punitive damages awards even in part upon the desire to punish a defendant for harm to persons that are not before the court. 

Williams arose from an Oregon trial wherein a jury awarded $821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages against cigarette manufacturer Philip Morris. At trial, the plaintiff’s attorney had urged the jury to punish Philip Morris for alleged harm to smokers other than the plaintiff by referring to the defendant’s market share and the number of smokers not only in the state of Oregon, but nationwide, who had allegedly contracted a smoking-related illness in the last 40 years. The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause forbids a jury from assessing punitive damages to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon non-parties or “strangers” to this litigation. While a jury may consider the actual or potential harm to non-parties in the narrow context of determining “reprehensibility” of the conduct, which in turn is one of the factors relevant to an analysis whether the punitive damages award is excessive or not, it may not punish the defendant for the impact of its alleged misconduct on other people, who may bring lawsuits of their own in which other juries can resolve their claims.

The Supreme Court cautioned state courts that they must make sure that the “jury will ask the right question, not the wrong one.”  That is, evidence regarding alleged injuries of those not before the court must be used solely to judge the reprehensibility of the conduct, not to assess damages for the harm caused to those strangers. While the Court commented on the Oregon court’s refusal to give a jury instruction clarifying this distinction, it noted generally that state courts cannot authorize any procedures that create an unreasonable and necessary risk of any such confusion occurring. When evidence is introduced or argument made that risks this confusion, the state court must take steps to protect against that risk. 

Another such conflict was seen in the recent Montana case involving the trial court's exclusion of a car seat manufacturer's evidence of regulatory compliance.  Malcolm v. Evenflo Co., 2009 WL 2917799 (Mont., September 14, 2009).  The state supreme court ruled that while the evidence should have been excluded from the jury's consideration of liability for compensatory damages, the evidence should have been admitted for purposes of assessing punitive damages.  It let stand the compensatory award, but vacated the punitive damages award.

The case arose from a motor vehicle accident during which plaintiff's decedent  rode in the back of an SUV in the OMW model 207 child seat. A northbound motorist swerved into plaintiff Malcolm's lane and forced Malcolm off the road. The vehicle rolled three times, traveled down a steep incline, and stopped in a ditch.  The left belt hook of the OMW broke off during the rollover. The seat belt slipped out from the open-ended belt hook on the opposite side of the seat. The forces of the accident ejected the OMW from the vehicle, which resulted in death, according to plaintiffs.

The theory at trial was strict liability in tort, design defect theory. The Malcolms claimed that the Evenflo OMW model 207 infant child safety seat constituted a defectively designed product that failed even though they had used the seat in a reasonably anticipated manner. The Malcolms pointed to the OMW's open-ended belt hook design that might have prevented the injury. The Malcolms contended that Evenflo could have manufactured the OMW using an allegedly  feasible superior alternative design that required the vehicle's seatbelt to be routed through an enclosed seat belt tunnel even when the seat was used without the base. The Malcolms also sought punitive damages. The Malcolms alleged that Evenflo “continued selling the defective product in conscious, deliberate and intentional disregard of the danger presented.”

Evenflo contended that the OMW model 207 was not defective in any way. Evenflo argued that the severity of the forces involved in the accident were the sole cause of the death. Evenflo argued that the “tremendous forces” that occurred during the rollover forced open the rear passenger door, which was immediately adjacent to Tyler's child seat. Evenflo posited that Tyler's car seat came into direct contact with the ground as the Suburban rolled. Evenflo argued that the contact caused the seat to detach from the seat belt system and ultimately fly out the open door.

The National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) requires that all child restraint systems comply with the minimum requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 213. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.213 (2009). NHTSA required Evenflo to conduct internal testing of the OMW to determine if it complied with the FMVSS 213 standards, which it did. NHTSA and Transport Canada, the Canadian testing agency, conducted random audit FMVSS 213 tests in addition to Evenflo's internal testing.

The first issue was the basic products issue: Evenflo argued that the trial court erred when it excluded any evidence that the OMW model 207 complied with FMVSS 213. Evenflo contended that the fact that the OMW model 207 passed 341 tests performed under FMVSS 213 was highly relevant to the claim that the model 207 was defective and unreasonably dangerous.

Evenflo noted that the standard would be admissible in a negligence case, and  there is no reason why such highly relevant evidence should not be used in strict products liability cases. Thus, Evenflo urged the Court to adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4 (1998). Section 4 provides that compliance with an applicable regulation is admissible in connection with liability for defective design. Evenflo noted that a majority of jurisdictions hold that compliance with product safety regulation is relevant and admissible on the question of defectiveness, even if it is not necessarily controlling.

The four-justice majority reiterated this court's adherence to “well-settled, decades-old principles of strict liability” that consider irrelevant a manufacturer's reasonableness and level of care. The court declined to adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, §4.  Montana thus continues to be one of those few states that cling to the now-discredited "bright line" verbal distinction between cases asserting strict liability in tort and those grounded in negligence theory. (This Court had previously distinguished strict liability from negligence when it rejected the “state of the art” defense, for example, because it raises issues of reasonableness and foreseeability --concepts fundamental to negligence law.)  It still argues that any attempt to inject so-called negligence principles into strict liability law would somehow sever Montana's strict products liability law from the core principles for which it was adopted.  The focus in design defect cases must be on “the condition of the product,” rather than “the manufacturer's conduct or knowledge."  And the way to do this, apparently, is to exclude relevant, material, probative evidence that the product passed regulatory muster.

On the punitive damages issue, Evenflo argued that the trial court's decision to exclude evidence of the OMW model 207's compliance with FMVSS 213 prevented it from introducing evidence bearing on its state of mind. A defendant's state of mind is a “key element” in assessing punitive damages, and the car seat maker should have been able to present evidence of its regulatory compliance. 

The trial court had concluded that the OMW model 207's compliance with FMVSS 213 had “absolutely no bearing at all upon the reprehensibility of the conduct of Evenflo.” But the supreme court could not sustain the verdict on punitives in light of the court's decision to exclude evidence that might show why Evenflo acted as it did, or failed to act, when the jury considered whether to award punitive damages. Evidence of Evenflo's good faith effort to comply with all government regulations, including FMVSS 213, would be evidence of conduct inconsistent with the mental state requisite for punitive damages.

Interestingly, the supreme court noted that while here a new jury here could consider evidence of the OMW model 207's compliance with FMVSS 213 for the purposes of determining whether Evenflo acted with actual fraud or actual malice, generally the Montana system provides for the presentation of evidence regarding liability for compensatory damages and punitive damages to the jury in a single proceeding. Thus, bifurcation is disfavored, and the trial courts must ordinarily trust that the jury will heed the court's instructions as to how to evaluate the evidence presented.

One dissenting justice would have also reversed the compensatory damages. He differed from the majority on how the trial was conducted and saw it as improperly biased against Evenflo. Two other dissenters agreed with the majority on the compensatory damages but would have sustained the punitive award, arguing that Evenflo's inability to present evidence of its compliance with regulations did not prejudice the company.

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Many a reader of MassTortDefense has wondered and worried about whether jurors were following a court's admonishment not to see or read anything about the issues in a case outside of the court room.  Sequestration is rare, especially in a civil case. (The O. J. Simpson jury was sequestered for eight and a half months.)  And with the advent of the Internet, jurors have potential access not only to publicity about the actual trial, but fingertip access to research tools on any issue in the case. Some of the same concerns arise with potential jurors; it may be impossible to ask enough specific questions in the voir dire process to ferret out every such issue.

A recent take on this comes in Russo v. Takata Corp., 2009 WL 2963065 (S.D. 9/16/09).  The South Dakota Supreme Court ruled that a potential juror's Google search of a defendant seat belt manufacturer, and his conversation about his findings with other jurors during deliberations, warranted a new trial.

Plaintiffs' decedent was a  sixteen year old driver of her mother's vehicle, on the way to school. The vehicle crossed the centerline, traveled back into its lane of traffic, slid sideways off of the shoulder of the road, and rolled almost three times down a steep ravine before hitting a tree. The girl was killed.  Plaintiffs alleged that the seat belt unlatched due to inertial forces acting on the buckles during the rollover. General Motors Corporation and Suzuki Motor Corporation settled their respective claims before trial.

Takata, the manufacturer of the model TK-52 seat belts installed in the vehicle, denied Plaintiffs' claims. Takata proceeded to trial under the theory that the decedent did not buckle her seat belt before the crash, and that she negligently failed to maintain control over the vehicle. Takata also denied that inertial unlatching of the model TK-52 seat belts was possible in real world accidents.
 

Takata filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude or limit evidence on alleged prior seat belt failures. The trial court determined that such evidence was “relevant solely to the issue of notice regarding the alleged defect” and irrelevant to whether a defect actually existed in the seat belt involved in this case. It then limited the evidence of prior alleged accidents, claims, and lawsuits to the issue of notice.

At trial, Plaintiffs presented evidence that other drivers or passengers had experienced seat belt failures in the past. Some of the witnesses were uncertain whether their seat belt was manufactured by Takata, or whether notification given to General Motors was passed on to Takata. Evidence was also presented to the jury that ten other lawsuits had been filed against Takata alleging seatbelt malfunctions. The jury was instructed that evidence of other lawsuits and complaints was “only for the purpose of establishing whether Takata had notice of the alleged defect.”

During deliberations, one juror asked out loud whether Takata had ever been sued. A juror (Flynn, according to the opinion) responded that he had done a Google search and had learned that Takata manufactured seat belts and airbags but did not find any lawsuits during his search. The entire exchange lasted approximately three to five minutes, and no report was made to the trial court concerning Flynn's remarks. The jury deliberated for approximately another one and one-half hours before reaching a verdict for Takata.  Plaintiffs later filed a Motion for New Trial alleging juror misconduct. Affidavits from ten jurors were filed with the motion.

The state Supreme Court noted it was announcing no hard and fast rule that all such types of Internet research by a juror prior to trial without notice to the court and counsel automatically doom a jury's verdict. Rather, the court gave deference to the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of being present throughout the nineteen-day trial. The trial court was in the best position to determine whether material was extrinsic to the issues before the jury, or whether the extraneous material prejudiced the jury. The trial court's award of a new trial was affirmed.
 

The reasoning: statutory language in many jurisdictions limits the type of information that a juror may be asked to provide via an affidavit or under oath at a hearing on a motion for new trial.  And that's the only way, typically, for a litigant to show juror conduct.  The prohibition on admitting testimony and affidavits pertains to intrinsic information, which includes statements or discussions which took place during deliberations.  Testimony and affidavits concerning extrinsic information, however, may be obtained from a juror.  Extrinsic information includes media publicity, conversations between jurors and non-jurors, and evidence not admitted by the court.  It also includes “knowledge relevant to the facts in issue not obtained through the introduction of evidence but acquired prior to trial, experiments, investigations, news media, etc.”   Secondly, the type of after-acquired information that potentially taints a jury verdict should be carefully distinguished from the general knowledge, opinions, feelings and bias that every juror carries into the jury room.

Takata argued that the information Flynn obtained during his Google searches was not extrinsic  because it was obtained before trial and was discoverable through voir dire.  As such, Takata argued it should have been explored during voir dire. The court found that Takata's argument that Plaintiffs could have asked more probing questions and possibly discovered Flynn's prior knowledge was likely valid. Takata's argument, however, missed the mark, said the court, in that Flynn obtained the information (that no lawsuits were listed on Takata's home page) after receiving his jury summons; that fact was specific to the defendant and relevant to evidence that was admitted at trial for a limited purpose under a carefully crafted order.  It pertained to the issue of knowledge of a defect with the TK-52 seat belt, an issue hotly contested between the parties, and it directly contradicted the evidence admitted at trial under the trial court's limiting order. This was not simply information that Flynn obtained in passing from media outlets prior to his awareness that a suit against defendants was pending.  The juror apparently sought out the information specifically in response to the receipt of the summons in which the names of the defendants were first made known to him, observed the court.

The burden of persuasion as to prejudice is on the party seeking a new trial. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that Flynn's extrinsic information prejudiced the jury's verdict. The information was presented to jurors at an arguably critical juncture during deliberations, and it had a tendency to influence the jury in a manner inconsistent with the evidence and the instructions of the trial court. Extrinsic information that goes beyond the mental processes of one juror and becomes known to other jurors can prejudice a jury verdict and affect the substantial rights of the party seeking a new trial. At least four jurors, including Flynn, were involved in the conversation in which Flynn revealed his Google search. While all jurors agreed that the jury did not discuss the Google search as a panel during deliberations, the state Supreme Court did not require that the entire jury be exposed to extrinsic information in order to proceed to determine whether there was prejudicial effect.

Takata argued on appeal that the verdict on the defect claims had already been put to a vote, and the jury found that her seatbelt was not defective. Plaintiffs argued in response that the jury verdict form had not been signed at the time Flynn made his remarks. Thus, they concluded the jury had yet to reach a final verdict at the time in question.

The state high court found that the trial court was in the best position to determine which claims had been dealt with and which ones remained to be discussed by the jury at the time of Flynn's comments. It concluded that the issue of whether the seat belts were defective and whether Takata had notice was "still in play" at the time Flynn revealed his Internet searches to members of the jury.

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The Indiana Supreme Court issued a decision recently, reminding us of the importance of fully developing the causation case, in addition to the response to plaintiff's defect allegations. Kovach v. Caligor Midwest, 2009 WL 2871172 (Ind. September 8, 2009).

The plaintiffs alleged their son was given a fatal overdose of pain medication by a nurse after a surgical procedure. The plaintiffs sued the manufacturers and distributors of the medicine cup used to administer the medication, alleging that defects in design of the cup made it unsuitable for the precise measurements necessary for drugs, and alleging a failure to warn that the cup was not suitable for precision measurement. The interior of the cup bore translucent markings to measure its contents, and graduations delineated both 15 and 30 mL. The nurse had used that type of cup frequently, both at this surgical center and at other hospitals, and she had no difficulty reading its markings. The nurse testified she filled the cup approximately half-way and administered 15 mL of medication to plaintiff's decedent.  According to decedent's father, however, who was present when the drug was administered, the nurse gave the son a full cup of medicine.

So, as is frequently the case, a potential malpractice claim is turned into a product liability claim against an ostensibly deeper pocket, unencumbered by med mal tort reform restrictions.

The plaintiffs presented expert evidence opining that the cup was defective in design and warnings, evidence that was challenged by the defense.  Plaintiffs also argued that if the medicine cup had been better suited as a precision measuring device or had contained a warning that it was not suitable for precision measurement, the decedent would not have received an overdose -- the alleged causal link.  The court did not have to reach the issues surrounding the alleged defects and the expert affidavit which plaintiffs had put forward to support their theory of defect, because the facts established that there was no such causal connection. The results of an autopsy revealed that the decedent had more than twice the recommended therapeutic level of codeine in his blood stream. The undisputed evidence thus demonstrated that if there was an overdose in this case, it was not caused by an imprecise measurement of medication attributable to less than readily discernible marks. (The plaintiff expert had estimated that the cup's imprecision could result in up to a 20% to 30% margin of error.) Rather, if the drug was the medical cause of the death, it was due to an erroneous, double dosage; the accident therefore cannot be attributed in a legal cause sense to any alleged defects in the cup itself.

Plaintiffs tried to then rely on the "read-and-heed" presumption -- i.e., the notion in some jurisdictions that the jury can presume that if an adequate warning had been given it would have been heeded. Such a presumption may aid a defendant when a warning was given.  Plaintiffs often try to use the presumption to attempt to clear the causation hurdle when no warning is given.  But the presumption does not completely dispose of the causation issue in a failure-to-warn case, said the court. The most the presumption does is establish that a warning would have been read and obeyed. It does not necessarily establish that the defect in fact caused the plaintiff's injury. The plaintiff invoking the presumption must still show that the danger which allegedly would have been prevented by an appropriate warning was the danger that actually materialized in the plaintiff's case.  

Plaintiffs could not show that element, given the circumstances of the drug usage. The judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the cup defendants was affirmed. 

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The federal court has dismissed a proposed class action accusing Dell Inc. of fraudulently marketing an ink-jet printer feature to convince customers to replace ink cartridges that don't need to be replaced yet. Dajani v. Dell Inc., 2009 WL 1833983 (N.D.Cal. June 25, 2009).

Dajani alleged that Dell fraudulently marketed its Ink Management System, a technology feature on all Dell ink jet printers.  The feature will display ink levels on a status window during a print job. The complaint alleged that the Ink Management System was highly imprecise and inaccurate, and that it was designed to deceive customers into replacing what they believed to be nearly empty cartridges, when they actually still contained a substantial amount of usable ink. Dajani sought to represent a class of all Californians who own or have owned Dell ink jet printers.

Judge Susan Illston rejected the lawsuit, without leave to amend the complaint.  Previously, the court had dismissed California-law based claims, as the terms and conditions of his sales agreement provided for Texas law to be allied to all claims. The amended complaint alleged a claim under Texas law for breach of implied warranty of merchantability and a claim of unjust
enrichment.

The court ruled last week that the claim for the breach of implied warranty of merchantability could not survive, because the printer was not unmerchantable as the term is defined under Texas law. The product must be unfit for the ordinary purposes for which it is used because of a lack of something necessary for adequacy.  Dell argued that the ordinary use of the product was printing, not measuring ink, and that any alleged imprecision in the Ink Management System had no impact on that basic function. The court agreed, finding that at most, plaintiff had alleged that the use of the Ink Management System is cumbersome because of allegedly premature replacement prompts. The device still worked.  And plaintiff hurt his claim by alleging that upon receiving “low ink” warnings, he simply removed and discarded his ink cartridge and replaced it with a new one. Such was "plainly at odds" with the product’s instruction manual, which states that a low ink warning appears when ink cartridges are low, not yet empty, and that a separate "reserve tank"  window appears when they are empty.

The judge also dismissed the unjust enrichment claim because under Texas law, when a valid, express contract covers the subject matter of the parties' dispute, there can be no recovery under a theory of unjust enrichment. Fortune Prod. Co. v. Conoco, Inc., 52 S.W.3d 671, 684 (Tex.2000) (“Parties should be bound by their express agreements. When a valid agreement already addresses the matter, recovery under an equitable theory is generally inconsistent with the express agreement.”).

Because plaintiff cannot cure the defects mentioned above through the pleading of additional facts which do not contradict those already made, plaintiff's complaint was dismissed without leave to amend.

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The Texas Supreme Court last week upheld summary judgment in a design defect case, finding that under the risk-utility test, the commercial trailer at issue was not defective as a matter of law. See Timpte Industries Inc. v. Gish, Texas, No. 08-0043, (6/5/09).

Readers of MassTortDefense recognize that in a strict products liability claim, the risk-utility test has been the dominant test of "defectiveness" employed by state courts. The opinion offers an interesting example of the potential relevance of an obvious design risk (even in a jurisdiction that has rejected the obvious danger rule), and the interplay of warnings and design issues.

Plaintiff Gish was seriously injured when he fell from the top of a commercial “Super Hopper” trailer into which he was attempting to load fertilizer. He sued Timpte, the manufacturer of the trailer, alleging, among other things, that several features of the trailer were defectively designed, rendering the trailer unreasonably dangerous. The Super Hopper trailer is a standard open-top, twin hopper trailer, which is loaded from above through use of a downspout or other device and is emptied through two openings on its bottom. Once the trailer is loaded, a tarp is rolled over the top
to protect its contents.  A ladder and an observation platform are attached to the front and rear of the trailer to allow the operator to view its contents.

The downspout that was loading fertilizer into the trailer was not lowering properly on the day of the accident.  Gish pulled on a rope to lower it, but that was unsuccessful, so he climbed up the front platform ladder and climbed onto the top rail to work with the downspout. A gust of wind hit him from the back, causing him to fall.

Plaintiff alleged defects in the top two rungs of the ladders attached to the front and rear of the trailer which allowed a person to climb atop the trailer; and a defect as to the top rail of the trailer, which was allegedly too narrow and slippery and contained too many tripping hazards for a person to walk safely along it.

To recover for a products liability claim alleging a design defect, under Texas law, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the product was defectively designed so as to render it unreasonably dangerous; (2) a safer alternative design existed; and (3) the defect was a producing cause of the injury for which the plaintiff seeks recovery. To determine whether a product was defectively designed so as to render it unreasonably dangerous, Texas courts have long applied a form of the risk-utility analysis that requires consideration of the following factors: (a) the utility of the product to the user and to the public as a whole weighed against the gravity and likelihood of injury from its use; (b) the availability of a substitute which would meet the same need and not be unsafe or unreasonably expensive; (c) the manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without seriously impairing its usefulness or significantly increasing its costs; (d) the user’s anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions; and (e) the expectations of the ordinary consumer.

The court emphasized that risk-utility analysis does not operate in a vacuum, but rather in the context of the product’s intended use and its intended users. Specifically, while Texas has rejected the “open and obvious danger rule” under which obvious risks are not design defects which must be remedied, the obviousness of the claimed defect is an important consideration in determining whether the product is unreasonably dangerous -- and may even be decisive in a particular case.

Essentially, Gish complained that the trailer’s design failed to prevent him from climbing atop the trailer and then, once he was up there, failed to protect him from the risk of falling. The court found no evidence, however, that the top rail of the trailer was unreasonably dangerous in light of its use and purpose. The risk of falling while trying to balance on a 5 inch wide strip of extruded aluminum nearly ten feet above the ground is an obvious risk that is certainly within the ordinary knowledge common to the community. Timpte warned users to always maintain three-point contact with the trailer, which is impossible for a user standing on the top rail. Had Gish adhered to this warning, his accident would not have happened. Additionally, widening the side walls of the trailer so as to convert the top rail into a safe walkway, as Gish’s expert proposed, would have increased the cost and weight of the trailer while decreasing its utility.

Moreover, Gish’s injury was only remotely related to the ladder’s top two rungs: they allowed him to climb atop the trailer, where he was subsequently injured. Timpte warned users not to use the ladder to climb into the trailer itself, and the obvious nature of the risk of climbing onto the top rail negated  the need for any additional warning. The two top rungs were necessary to maintain the stability of the ladder and provide an emergency handhold in the event someone slips on the ladder. Their utility was high, the court concluded, and Gish's injury was “only remotely related” to those rungs.

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