Meal Break Class Certification Denied

A California appeals court refused last week to revive a putative class action that alleged the defendant employer had not given employees adequate meal breaks. See In re: Walgreen Company Overtime Cases, No. B230191 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist.,10/23/14).  What is interesting is that significant part of the reasoning related to the fact that multiple putative class members recanted at deposition declarations that had been prepared and submitted by class counsel. 

This class action was about meal breaks at work, and  while the company's stated policy was adequate, in practice the company allegedly departed from the policy. (California employers must give workers time off to eat meals at work.) The trial court denied plaintiffs'  motion for class certification. Plaintiff appealed.

The court of appeals noted the burden on the moving party is to “demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.” Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.  California courts generally afford trial courts great latitude in granting or denying class certification, and normally review a ruling on certification for an abuse of discretion. While a class certification motion is not a license for a free-floating inquiry into the validity of the complaint’s allegations, issues affecting the merits
of a case may be enmeshed with class action requirements.  Thus, analysis of a class certification’s propriety frequently will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim. That cannot be helped, said the court.

A legal issue is (1) whether an employer must merely make meal breaks available, or (2) whether the employer must actually ensure employees take the breaks. Walgreens employees apparently sometimes did decide to skip or delay breaks. One employee explained, for instance, that “I generally take my lunch breaks, but about once a week I will skip lunch because I want to be able to leave work early.” Another testified that, “[e]ven though it has always been Walgreens’ policy to provide a 30-minute meal period, I preferred to skip mine and instead leave early. If I am not hungry, which is typically the case, I do not need a meal period, especially since it is unpaid time.” There
was other similar evidence about skipping or delaying breaks.  

California has adopted the make available standard. To meet this test, attorneys for the class plaintiff submitted 44 form declarations from other workers, all saying that Walgreen forced them to work through some meal breaks because their store was understaffed.  The trial court gave the declarations no weight because they were deemed unreliable. That is, most witnesses recanted their declarations to some degree or entirely at their deposition. The court of appeals stated that the prevalence of apparent falsity in the declarations raised questions about how the lawyers had created these declarations in the first place.

The trial court was “especially troubled” that, once deposed, so many witnesses recanted their declarations. The court of appeals agreed, "Form declarations present a problem. When witnesses speak exactly the same words, one wonders who put those words there, and how accurate and reliable those words are."  There is nothing attractive, said the court, about submitting form declarations contrary to the witnesses’ actual testimony. Thus, it was not error for the trial court to give these unreliable declarations no weight.

Denial of certification affirmed.

 

Federal Court Grants Defense Motion to Deny Class Certification

A federal court earlier this month denied class certification in a case involving allegedly defective Sonicare Diamond Clean and Healthy White powered toothbrushes.  Coe v. Philips Oral Healthcare, Inc., No. C13-518MJP (W.D. Wash., 10/10/14).  Readers should note this was another example of a putative class defendant taking the initiative and moving preemptively to strike class allegations.

Plaintiffs sought a certification of a nationwide class of toothbrush purchasers under the Washington Consumer Protection Act-- something having to do with the attachment of the metal shaft of the device affecting the brush strokes per minute.  Defendant moved to deny class certification. We have posted about this tactic before.  Fed.R.Civ. P. 23 does not preclude affirmative motions to deny class certification. In Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,571 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the right of defendants to bring preemptive motions, provided that plaintiffs are not procedurally prejudiced by the timing of the motion. Id. at 994.

Resolution of the class certification issue, said the court, turned primarily on the choice-of-law analysis, which determines whether Washington law or the laws of putative class members' home states should apply. If Washington law applied, common questions were more likely to predominate for a nationwide class, and a class action may seem more efficient and desirable. On the other hand, if the consumer protection laws of the consumers' home states apply, variations in the laws will overwhelm common questions, precluding certification. The next inquiry then was whether sufficient discovery had taken place to allow for the choice-of-law analysis. The court concluded it had.

Defendant showed that an actual conflict exists between the Washington Consumer Protection Act ("WCPA") and the consumer protection laws of other states.  Because a conflict exists, the court applied Washington's most significant relationship test in order to determine which law to apply. In adopting the approach of the Second Restatement of Law on Conflict of Laws (1971), Washington has rejected the rule of lex loci delicti (the law of the place where the wrong took place).  Instead, Washington's test requires courts to determine which state has the "most significant relationship" to the cause of action.  If the relevant contacts to the cause of action are balanced, the court considers the interests and public policies of potentially concerned states and the manner and extent of such policies as they relate to the transaction. 


Washington, observed the court, has a significant relationship to alleged deceptive trade practices by a Washington corporation. Washington has a strong interest in promoting a fair and honest business environment in the state, and in preventing its corporations from engaging in unfair or deceptive trade practices in Washington or elsewhere. Conversely, said the court, the putative class members' home states have significant relationships to allegedly deceptive trade practices resulting in injuries to their citizens within their borders. The Toothbrushes were sold and purchased, and representations of their quality made and relied on, entirely outside of Washington. No Plaintiff resides in Washington. While Plaintiffs contend Philips Oral Healthcare spent considerable time and resources analyzing the problem and attempting to fix it at their Washington facilities, thus increasing Washington's relationship to the action, the crux of Plaintiffs' action involves the marketing and sale of the Toothbrushes, which took place in other states.

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit recently recognized the strong interest of each state in determining the optimum level of consumer protection balanced against a more favorable business environment, and to calibrate its consumer protection laws to reflect their chosen balance. Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012). Washington has formally adopted § 148 of the Restatement in the fraud and misrepresentation context. FutureSelect Portfolio Mgmt., Inc. v. Tremont Grp. Holdings, Inc., 180 Wn.2d 954, 331 P.3d 29, 36 (2014). Section 148 of the Restatement and its comments make clear that the alleged misrepresentation to consumers and the consumers' pecuniary injuries, both of which occurred in consumers' home states and not in Washington, should be considered the most significant contacts in this particular case. Restatement (Second) of Law on Conflict of Laws § 148 cmts. i, j (1971).


Thus, the court agreed with defendant that consumers' home states had the most significant relationship to their causes of action. Therefore, the consumer protection laws of those states, and not WCPA, would apply. Material differences between the various consumer protection laws prevent Plaintiffs from demonstrating Rule 23(b)(3) predominance and manageability for a nationwide class. Accordingly, the Court granted defendant's motion to deny certification of a nationwide class under WCPA.