Eleventh Circuit Affirms Exclusion of Expert Testimony on General Causation

The 11th Circuit has affirmed a trial court’s exclusion of key expert causation proof in a suit against the manufacturer of Remicade, finding the expert evidence was not adequately supported by scientific studies or literature. Goldstein v. Centocor Inc., 2009 WL 275322 (11th Cir. 2/05/09).

Plaintiff-appellant contended that the prescription medication Remicade caused his pulmonary fibrosis, requiring a bilateral lung replacement. The trial court excluded plaintiff’s expert testimony on general causation, pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The court of appeals reviews a trial court's Daubert rulings under an abuse of discretion standard. McClain v. Metabolife Intern'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir.2005).

Plaintiff’s expert did not rely on any epidemiological studies that connect Remicade with pulmonary fibrosis. This is not necessarily fatal, said the 11th Circuit, but it makes a plaintiff’s task to show general causation more difficult. See Rider v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir.2002).

In the absence of epidemiological studies, the expert reviewed four sources to make his general causation assessment. The first category, plaintiff's lung and bowel pathology reports, was not relevant to general causation; its focus on the plaintiff made it relevant to specific causation. See McClain, 401 F.3d at 1239 (“General causation is concerned with whether an agent increases the incidence of disease in a group and not whether the agent caused any given individual's disease.”). The second category, MedWatch case reports submitted by doctors who observed possible reactions to Remicade, have a limited weight. Such reports are made without medical controls or scientific assessment, and while they may support other proof of causation, alone they cannot prove causation. Id. at 1199. (putting aside an expert’s reliance on such reports, they are hearsay and do not fall within any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule; also, the prejudicial effect of these reports outweighs their probative value.)

The third category, a review of medical textbooks, revealed no relevant general causation information, only extended analogies. The fourth category, a review of abstracts of four articles linking Remicade with pulmonary fibrosis, is relevant to general causation but provided only very limited information.

A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, (1997). The district court did so here, and the 11th Circuit found no abuse of discretion in its determination.
 

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