Mass Tort Defense : Mass Tort Defense Lawyer & Attorney : Sean P. Wajert : Dechert Law Firm : Products Liability, Class Actions, Pharmaceutical Litigation

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed field and recently dismissed the appeal of a closely watched failure-to-warn case alleging harmful asbestos exposure.  Bugosh v. I.U. North America, et al., No. 7 WAP 2008 (S.Ct. Pa. June 16, 2009).

One of the key issues presented by the case was whether Pennsylvania product liability law would change from its current unique form of somewhat extreme strict liability to the more mainstream Third Restatement approach to the issue of liability for  product sellers.

The divided ruling  by the Court involved the claim of a deceased mesothelioma patient, Edward Bugosh, whose widow had been awarded $1.4 million in damages by a jury in the trial court.  I.U.  North America was a non-manufacturer distributor named in the wrongful death suit, based solely on its predecessor’s sale of a small amount of asbestos-containing products.

Traditional products liability law in the state is based on Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and finds that every party in the distribution chain is strictly liable for any product defect in the product they sold. The Third Restatement treats intermediate sellers differently than manufacturers. Specifically, while under current law, liability can be imposed on manufacturers, retailers and distributors for injuries caused by products with manufacturing, design, or informational defects, regardless of whether a defendant acted reasonably in the preparation and sale of the product at issue, the appeal sought to persuade the state Supreme Court to adopt the approach of Section 2 of the new Restatement, which would require plaintiffs to prove that a defendant acted unreasonably. 

The dismissal order finds review was improvidently granted, but gives no further reason.  Speculation centers on this status of the defendant as an intermediate seller, rather than as an actual manufacturer.  The Court may have felt that this was not the best context to consider a major change in the law.

The case drew tremendous interest, with amici on the appellant’s side to include the Pennsylvania Defense Institute, the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and Industry, Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, National Association of Manufacturers, NFIB Small Business Legal Center, National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors, American Tort Reform Association, American Insurance Association, Property and Casualty Insurers Association of America, National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, American Chemistry Council, and the Washington Legal Foundation.

This result arguably leaves Pennsylvania law very much muddled, as recently the Third Circuit predicted that Pennsylvania would adopt the Third Restatement. See Berrier v. Simplicity Manufacturing, Inc., 563 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2009).  In state court, the traditional Pennsylvania version (based on Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978)) of strict liability prevails, while the federal courts may be following Berrier to apply the Third Restatement in diversity cases based upon Pennsylvania law.

Plaintiff had argued that a return to a fault-based system would unfairly increase the plaintiffs’ burden of proof, and adoption of the Third Restatement would reduce the incentive to product manufacturers and suppliers to distribute safer products. 

In a sharply worded dissent to the dismissal, two justices called the current law severely
deficient, particularly when measured against developed understanding and experience, and argued that necessary adjustments are long overdue. The current distinctions that Pennsylvania law makes between negligence and strict liability have no place in any scheme purporting to recognize that manufacturers and distributors are not outright insurers for all harm involving their products.

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In the multidistrict product liability litigation over "Stand ‘n Seal," a federal judge is allowing, over plaintiffs' objections, testimony from the defendants' causation experts.  Judge Thomas W. Thrash of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia has ruled that three experts, who opined that Stand ‘n Seal does not emit sufficient amounts of the chemical which plaintiffs allege caused their injuries, including chemical pneumonitis, may testify. In Re Stand ‘N Seal Products Liability Litigation, MDL NO. 1804 (N.D. Ga.).

Plaintiffs in the roughly 200 personal injury actions in the MDL assert that Stand ‘n Seal  manufactured with Flexipel S-22WS caused respiratory problems. Stand ‘n Seal is a consumer product used to seal ceramic tile grout in kitchens, bathrooms, and similar areas. The advertised advantage of Stand ‘n Seal was that users can easily stand and spray the sealant onto the grout without the strain of using a brush and manually applying the sealant. The plaintiffs say that the
problems with Stand ‘n Seal began when the manufacturer changed its chemical components to include Flexipel.

Part of the defense has been the dose-response issue that plaintiffs could not have inhaled a harmful amount of the chemical while using Stand ‘n Seal as directed. The plaintiffs urged the court to exclude this expert testimony of Drs. Mark Rigler, William Longo, and Mitchell Sauerhoff.  Rigler and Longo, industrial hygiene experts, tested samples of Stand ‘n Seal and concluded that plaintiffs did not inhale an “analytically detectable” concentration of Flexipel, the specific chemical at issue.  They did not, contrary to plaintiffs' arguments, opine that users of Stand ‘n Seal had absolutely no exposure to Flexipel.  Instead, they have said that users of Stand ‘n Seal were not exposed to “any significant” or “analytically detectable” amounts of Flexipel. In other words, there is a range between zero and the detection limit of their testing, but they believe that range is insignificant.

Instead, said the defense experts, the users of Stand ‘n Seal had a much higher probability of inhaling significant levels of Isopar-G, a solvent used in various formulations of grouting. Defendants intend to offer expert testimony from Mitchell Sauerhoff that overexposure to Isopar-G can cause respiratory injury.  Judge Thrash concluded that the experts’ opinions were admissible. 

“The plaintiffs' experts disagree with Sauerhoff’s opinions, but that disagreement by itself does not make Sauerhoff’s or Rigler and Longo’s testimony inadmissible.”  The court noted that "none of these [potential alternative] explanations seems especially conclusive."  But the alleged generality of the defense experts’ alternate explanations for the cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries affect the weight, not the admissibility, of the expert testimony.”   MassTortDefense notes that plaintiffs often forget that the defendant does not have the burden to disprove causation.  So defense evidence of alternative causes can be admissible even if such evidence would be insufficient when offered by a plaintiff who has the burden of proof on causation.

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The House Energy and Commerce Committee last week approved legislation that would give the FDA more funding and power to police food safety.  The unanimous voice vote for a version of the bill offered by committee Chairman Henry Waxman (D., Calif.) came after extensive negotiations between Democrats and Republicans. The "Food Safety Enhancement Act of 2009,"  H.R. 2749, will now go to the entire House.

The bill comes at least in part in response to recent outbreaks of illnesses traced to tainted spinach, peanuts, hot peppers and other foods. The legislation would give the FDA greater authority to order food recalls, impose new civil penalties, and require inspections of so-called high-risk food facilities at least once a year.  It also calls for companies to keep detailed records to help the FDA more quickly trace the distribution of tainted foods and track the source of the contamination.  Specifically, the FDA would be required to issue regulations that require food producers, manufacturers, processors, transporters or holders to maintain the full pedigree of the origin and previous distribution history of the food and to link that history with the subsequent distribution history of the food.
 

The Grocery Manufacturers Association, a food industry group, released a statement in support of the bill, after Democrats agreed to a number of changes. (For example, they added a cap so no company would be charged more than $175,000 in fees to pay for the new bill.)  Critics of the bill argue that it would impose a one-size-fits-all regulatory scheme on big and small farms and on national and local food producers; does not address the major underlying causes of food safety problems such as industrial agriculture practices and the consolidation of our food supply. Others assert that the bill, by apparently empowering the FDA to regulate how crops are raised and harvested, puts the federal government right on the farm, dictating to farmers "good farming practices" on organic farming, use of manure, GMO animal feed, animal drugs, and petrochemical fertilizers and pesticide issues.

At last report, the House hasn't scheduled a vote on the legislation. In the Senate, Illinois Democrat Dick Durbin has introduced similar food-safety legislation.

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New and more extensive government regulation may be in the future for a host of industries and products we have blogged about at MassTortDefense, including tobacco, medical devices, food, and drugs.  A new report from the "Investor Environmental Health Network" calls for regulations not of the products themselves, but new rules governing disclosure of potential liabilities that can arise from emerging product technologies like nanotechnology.

EHN is a partnership of investment managers who report they oversee more than $25 billion in assets. The new report identifies alleged "loopholes" in the current system of securities and accounting regulation that the group says prevent a complete reporting of a firm's potential liabilities. They point, as a case study, to the alleged danger of asbestos-like litigation risks for nanotechnology companies and investors, as potentially "ultra-hazardous" nanotechnologies enter the market.

They argue that nanomaterials, lighter and stronger than other materials, are used in hundreds of products already on the market, including many cosmetics and skin care products. They cite a  study published in May, 2008 which suggested certain carbon nanotubes could have similar health effects as asbestos; and they point to a concern that particles at the nano level will be able to penetrate membranes in the brain in a way traditional particles do not.  Materials can take on new properties at the nano level, becoming stronger, or better conductors of heat or electricity, for example. But what creates their potential for new applications across a range of industries, may also be the source of their risk. 

The report calls for more consistent liability estimates made to insurers and investors; benchmarking liabilities against other companies whose published litigation results could offer another estimate of liability; and several new disclosure regulations from the SEC.

Companies developing or contemplating selling products with nanotechnology will, of course, want to monitor these efforts, which seem at times to call for a level of foresight requiring a working crystal ball. This particular report appears to assume that all the potential risks of nanotechnology are real; that manufacturers have no interest in exploring the potential risks; and, if they do, certainly won't ever disclose them.  Begrudgingly, it admits that "a number of questions remain regarding whether carbon nanotubes will actually cause health harms to the same degree that asbestos did."  That's an understatement.  In fact, the published studies relate to only some forms of carbon nanotubes, and like any potentially toxic substance, the levels of exposure to carbon nanotubes by workers or consumers is a key issue in assessing risk.  Many of the current uses of nanotechnology are in FDA-regulated products where there is a demonstrated lack of dermal absorption. Similarly, regarding potential nanotechnology in food packaging, substances used in food packaging are already regulated by FDA as “food contact substances” with the burden resting on the sponsor of a new food contact substance to demonstrate its safety.

Currently, companies involved in nanotechnology regularly disclose to investors that there is no scientific agreement on the health effects of nanomaterials; they note that some scientists believe that in some exposure contexts, nanomaterials may be hazardous to an individual’s health or the environment. They disclose that the science of nanotechnology is based on arranging atoms in way not made in nature; that future research into the effects of nanomaterials may thus have an adverse effect on products using the new technology.  They also typically disclose that the future regulation and limitation of the kinds of materials used in or used to develop nanotechnology-based products could halt or delay the commercialization such products. Such disclosures would seem to put investors on adequate notice of an uncertain future; speculative and alarmist predictions of the "next asbestos" seem unwarranted.

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Some have expressed the sentiment that the the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation always grants requests for MDL status.  In reality, that is not the case, although opposition to MDL status can be an uphill battle in burgeoning mass torts. (FYI Volume 82, Number 6 (June 2008) issue of the Tulane Law Review is devoted to "The Problem of Multidistrict Litigation." )

The JPML recently declined to consolidate federal litigation involving the heartburn medication metoclopramide, finding that the pending actions do not share sufficient factual issues concerning whether the drug causes neurological injuries. (In re Reglan/Metoclopramide Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 2049, 6/3/09).

The Panel was not persuaded that Section 1407 centralization would serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses or further the just and efficient conduct of this litigation at the present time. The eleven actions at issue did share some factual issues as to whether the drug metoclopramide causes neurological injuries (principally, tardive dyskinesia). But there is no single common defendant, and some entities, are named in only one or two actions. Moreover, several of the actions appear to be substantially more advanced (five were commenced in either 2006 or 2007). Metoclopramide litigation thus has a somewhat lengthy history, and the record indicates that a significant amount of the common discovery has already taken place in some cases. The proponents of centralization failed to convince the Panel that any remaining common questions of fact among these actions are sufficiently complex and/or numerous to justify Section 1407 transfer at this time. Alternatives to transfer exist that may minimize whatever possibilities there might be of duplicative discovery and/or inconsistent pretrial rulings, concluded the Panel. 

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The federal judge presiding over the MDL involving litigation claiming trailers issued after Hurricane Katrina allegedly exposed residents to formaldehyde has declined to dismiss government contractors that hauled and installed the trailers.  In re  FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 1873 (E.D. La.).  Judge Engelhardt rejected the motion of Shaw Environmental Inc. and CH2M Hill Constructors, Inc. to be dismissed from a multiple-plaintiff case in the trailer MDL.  The court rejected the contractors' arguments that the plaintiffs lacked standing;  he also rejected the contractors'  argument that the FEMA trailer residents failed to plead claims cognizable under the Louisiana Products Liability Act.

The plaintiffs in this case are Louisiana residents who had lived in trailers issued by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. They sued the makers and distributors of FEMA trailers
in November, 2007. Then in early 2009, the plaintiffs added trailer haulers and installers,
Shaw and CH2M Hill, as defendants.

The contractors argued first that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had failed to link  particular plaintiffs to any particular defendant involved in their specific unit.  The court ruled that because the original complaint matched plaintiffs to trailer manufacturers, those originally named plaintiffs had standing to add defendants in the chain of distribution. Those plaintiffs who failed to assert any linkage at all were dismissed without prejudice.

Second, the contractors argued prescription, the Louisiana version of laches, asserting that the plaintiffs' products liability claims prescribed on May 18, 2007, or one year after the first trailer suit was filed. The contractors claimed that the plaintiffs should have known about their claim for formaldehyde exposure by that date. Judge Engelhardt, however, ruled that the clock started from the date of injury, and it is impossible to determine in advance exactly when each plaintiff became aware of his or her injuries.

"What each ... plaintiff knew about formaldehyde exposure or the possibility of legal claims relating thereto; what injury each such plaintiff allegedly experienced from such exposure, and when knowledge of these alleged injuries occurred, are questions that can be answered only a case-by-case basis. These facts are not evident from the face of the complaints,” Judge Engelhardt wrote.

Finally, Judge Engelhardt rejected the contractors contention that the state product liability act did not apply to them because they were not manufacturers of the trailers.  While Louisiana law determines that the proper assembly of a defective part does not create manufacturer liability, here, in contrast, plaintiffs contended that the alleged formaldehyde-related defect occurred in part because of the assembly process used by the contractors.  An alleged defect which manifests itself in the assembly process can impose Louisiana Products Liability Act "manufacturer" liability on a party when the defect is created by the assembly process, he concluded.

Readers will recall that last December, the court properly refused to grant class certification to the six proposed subclasses of plaintiffs in this MDL, finding they did not meet the standards required for class certification under Rule 23. The plaintiffs had sought certification of four state subclasses of individuals who resided in trailers provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in Louisiana, Texas, Alabama and Mississippi following hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as well as a future medical monitoring subclass, and an economic loss subclass.  And the court has begun selecting bellwether cases for the first trials.

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The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that an injunction against lawsuits in the landmark bankruptcy case of asbestos manufacturer Johns-Manville does in fact bar claims now asserted by asbestos plaintiffs against the company’s insurer, Travelers Indemnity Co.  In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed an opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, ruling that a bankruptcy judge properly interpreted the 1986 injunction to apply to the later claims.

MassTortDefense alerted readers to this case late last year. The case arises from the now-decades old Manville bankruptcy. From the 1920s until the 1970s, Johns-Manville was the largest manufacturer of asbestos-containing products and the largest supplier of raw asbestos in the United States. As a result, in the 1960s and 1970s, Johns-Manville became the target of many product liability suits. Johns-Manville filed for Chapter 11 protection under the federal bankruptcy law on Aug. 26, 1982. On that date, Johns-Manville was a defendant in more than 12,500 asbestos-related suits. To fund its reorganization plan, the bankruptcy court allowed Johns-Manville to settle its insurance claims for about $850 million.

Travelers, Johns-Manville's primary insurer from 1947 to 1976, paid about $100 million into the bankruptcy estate in exchange for a full and final release of Manville-related claims. In 1986, Bankruptcy Judge Lifland entered a series of confirmation orders, inter alia barring any person from commencing any actions based upon, arising out of, or related to insurance policies that Travelers issued to Manville. In 2004, Judge Lifland found that his injunction was being violated by a new species of asbestos-related lawsuits (referred to by some as “direct action” claims) against insurers. These new asbestos claims were part of a global strategy developed by the plaintiffs' bar to put insurers in Manville's shoes and thereby hold them liable on account of their insurance relationship with Manville. The injunction in the meantime had become the model for a statutory change adopted as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, establishing Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, which expressly authorized the Manville approach to be used in future asbestos bankruptcies.  So the attacks had potentially widespread significance.

The Second Circuit, rather than enforce the confirmation order as it was originally written, which had been affirmed on a prior appeal, ruled that Judge Lifland had exceeded the “subject matter jurisdiction” granted by the bankruptcy code. In re: Johns-Manville Corp., 517 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2008). The Second Circuit concluded that the bankruptcy court in 1986 was without power to enjoin all claims that literally arise out of the insurance policies that Manville purchased from Travelers. Thus, the bankruptcy court had also exceeded its authority in approving a multi–million dollar settlement of asbestos claims filed against Travelers. The appeals court said the bedrock issue in this case required a determination as to whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the disputed statutory and common law claims. While the bankruptcy court repeatedly used the terms “arising out of” and “related to,”  global finality for Travelers is only as global as the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court, however, held "that the terms of the injunction bar the actions and that the finality of the bankruptcy court’s orders following the conclusion of direct review generally stands in the way of challenging the enforceability of the injunction.” Justice David Souter wrote for the majority. The 1986 Orders became final on direct review over two decades ago, and whether the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction and authority to enter the injunction in 1986 was not properly before the Court of Appeals in 2008. 

The respondents' position that the 1986 Orders only bar actions against insurers when those actions seek to recover derivatively for Manville’s wrongdoing, but not actions to recover for Travelers’ own alleged misconduct, simply is not what the 1986 Orders say. There is no language limiting it to derivative claims.  The Bankruptcy Court in this case plainly had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its own prior orders, in part because it explicitly retained jurisdiction to enforce its injunctions.  Once the 1986 Orders became final on direct review (whether or not proper exercises of bankruptcy court jurisdiction and power), they became res judicata to the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. Those orders are not any the less preclusive because the attack is on the Bankruptcy Court’s conformity with its subject-matter jurisdiction, for even subject-matter jurisdiction generally may not be attacked collaterally.

The Court stated that "our holding is narrow."  They did not resolve whether a bankruptcy court, in 1986 or today, could properly enjoin claims against non-debtor insurers that are not derivative of the debtor’s wrongdoing. Still an important issue in a mass tort driven bankruptcy.  Nor did the Court decide whether any particular respondent is bound by the 1986 Orders.   Thus, the Court appeared to be making an effort not to address the actual underlying issue here.

In a dissenting opinion, however, Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
sided with the Second Circuit, arguing that the bankruptcy court had exceeded its jurisdiction by barring the suits. 

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The Texas Supreme Court last week upheld summary judgment in a design defect case, finding that under the risk-utility test, the commercial trailer at issue was not defective as a matter of law. See Timpte Industries Inc. v. Gish, Texas, No. 08-0043, (6/5/09).

Readers of MassTortDefense recognize that in a strict products liability claim, the risk-utility test has been the dominant test of "defectiveness" employed by state courts. The opinion offers an interesting example of the potential relevance of an obvious design risk (even in a jurisdiction that has rejected the obvious danger rule), and the interplay of warnings and design issues.

Plaintiff Gish was seriously injured when he fell from the top of a commercial “Super Hopper” trailer into which he was attempting to load fertilizer. He sued Timpte, the manufacturer of the trailer, alleging, among other things, that several features of the trailer were defectively designed, rendering the trailer unreasonably dangerous. The Super Hopper trailer is a standard open-top, twin hopper trailer, which is loaded from above through use of a downspout or other device and is emptied through two openings on its bottom. Once the trailer is loaded, a tarp is rolled over the top
to protect its contents.  A ladder and an observation platform are attached to the front and rear of the trailer to allow the operator to view its contents.

The downspout that was loading fertilizer into the trailer was not lowering properly on the day of the accident.  Gish pulled on a rope to lower it, but that was unsuccessful, so he climbed up the front platform ladder and climbed onto the top rail to work with the downspout. A gust of wind hit him from the back, causing him to fall.

Plaintiff alleged defects in the top two rungs of the ladders attached to the front and rear of the trailer which allowed a person to climb atop the trailer; and a defect as to the top rail of the trailer, which was allegedly too narrow and slippery and contained too many tripping hazards for a person to walk safely along it.

To recover for a products liability claim alleging a design defect, under Texas law, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the product was defectively designed so as to render it unreasonably dangerous; (2) a safer alternative design existed; and (3) the defect was a producing cause of the injury for which the plaintiff seeks recovery. To determine whether a product was defectively designed so as to render it unreasonably dangerous, Texas courts have long applied a form of the risk-utility analysis that requires consideration of the following factors: (a) the utility of the product to the user and to the public as a whole weighed against the gravity and likelihood of injury from its use; (b) the availability of a substitute which would meet the same need and not be unsafe or unreasonably expensive; (c) the manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without seriously impairing its usefulness or significantly increasing its costs; (d) the user’s anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions; and (e) the expectations of the ordinary consumer.

The court emphasized that risk-utility analysis does not operate in a vacuum, but rather in the context of the product’s intended use and its intended users. Specifically, while Texas has rejected the “open and obvious danger rule” under which obvious risks are not design defects which must be remedied, the obviousness of the claimed defect is an important consideration in determining whether the product is unreasonably dangerous -- and may even be decisive in a particular case.

Essentially, Gish complained that the trailer’s design failed to prevent him from climbing atop the trailer and then, once he was up there, failed to protect him from the risk of falling. The court found no evidence, however, that the top rail of the trailer was unreasonably dangerous in light of its use and purpose. The risk of falling while trying to balance on a 5 inch wide strip of extruded aluminum nearly ten feet above the ground is an obvious risk that is certainly within the ordinary knowledge common to the community. Timpte warned users to always maintain three-point contact with the trailer, which is impossible for a user standing on the top rail. Had Gish adhered to this warning, his accident would not have happened. Additionally, widening the side walls of the trailer so as to convert the top rail into a safe walkway, as Gish’s expert proposed, would have increased the cost and weight of the trailer while decreasing its utility.

Moreover, Gish’s injury was only remotely related to the ladder’s top two rungs: they allowed him to climb atop the trailer, where he was subsequently injured. Timpte warned users not to use the ladder to climb into the trailer itself, and the obvious nature of the risk of climbing onto the top rail negated  the need for any additional warning. The two top rungs were necessary to maintain the stability of the ladder and provide an emergency handhold in the event someone slips on the ladder. Their utility was high, the court concluded, and Gish's injury was “only remotely related” to those rungs.

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The U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has consolidated a number of lawsuits brought over Chinese-made drywall installed in U.S. homes. See In re: Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products Liability Litigation, MDL-2047 (JPML).

The motion for consolidation encompassed ten actions, four actions in the Southern District of Florida, three actions in the Middle District of Florida and one action each in the Northern District of Florida, Eastern District of Louisiana, and Southern District of Ohio. The panel said it was aware of 67 related lawsuits that were pending in federal courts around the country. Those suits and any other related actions will be treated as potential tag-along actions.

The Panel found that all actions share factual questions concerning drywall manufactured in China, imported to and distributed in the United States, and used in the construction of houses; plaintiffs in all actions allege that the drywall emits smelly, corrosive gases. Centralization under Section 1407 will eliminate duplicative discovery, including any discovery on international parties; prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, particularly those with respect to class certification issues; and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel and the judiciary, said the Panel.

As is sometimes the case, no district was a clear focal point of this litigation. The common manufacturing defendant and its affiliates are foreign entities without a major presence in any of the suggested transferee districts. Most actions also name local entities, such as builders and suppliers, as defendants. Several parties suggested different districts, and all of the suggested districts, particularly those in the southeastern region, have a nexus to the litigation through allegedly affected houses built with the drywall at issue. On balance, the panel was persuaded that the Eastern District of Louisiana is a preferable transferee forum for this litigation. Centralization in this district permits the Panel to effect the Section 1407 assignment to a judge who has "extensive experience in multidistrict litigation as well as the ability and temperament to steer this complex litigation on a steady and expeditious course." That would be the Honorable Eldon E. Fallon of the Eastern District of Louisiana.

As posted on MassTortDefense before, the lawsuits allege that sulfur compound levels in the drywall are too high, causing issues with air conditioning systems, electrical appliances, internal wiring and other electrical systems in homes. Plaintiffs also allege the drywall produces a rotten egg-like stench and causes a variety of respiratory and other health problems for those who live in the affected homes. The lawsuits filed so far have named Chinese-based manufacturers, as well as importers, developers and builders, contractors, suppliers and others. Companies facing suits include Knauf Gips KG, Knauf Plasterboard Tianjin Co., Taishan Gypsum Co., L&W Supply Corp. and USG Corp. Lennar Corp., a major home builder, has brought in more than 20 manufacturers, suppliers and installers.  Some legislators have been critical of the CPSC's handling of the issue.  And bills have been introduced to ban the product.

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