Supreme Court Rules on Effect of Offers to Named Class Plaintiffs

The U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision earlier this week in a case raising the issue whether a defendant can cut off a Telephone Consumer Protection Act class action by making an offer of full relief to individual named plaintiffs. See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, No. 14-857 (U.S. 1/20/16).

Here is the background: the Navy contracted with petitioner Campbell to develop a multimedia recruiting campaign that included the sending of text messages to young adults, but only if those individuals had “opted in” to receipt of marketing solicitations on topics that included Navy service. Respondent Gomez alleged that he did not consent to receive text messages and, at age 40, was not in the Navy’s targeted age group anyway. Gomez filed a nationwide class action, alleging that Campbell violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U. S. C. §227(b)(1)(A)(iii), which prohibits “using any automatic dialing system” to send a text message to a cellular telephone, absent the recipient’s prior express consent. He sought treble statutory damages for a willful and knowing TCPA violation and an injunction against Campbell’s involvement in unsolicited messaging.

Before the deadline for Gomez to file a motion for class certification, Campbell proposed to settle Gomez’s individual claim and filed an offer of judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. Gomez did not accept the offer and allowed the Rule 68 submission to lapse on expiration of the time (14 days) specified in the Rule. Campbell then moved to dismiss the case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Campbell argued first that its offer mooted Gomez’s individual claim by providing him with complete relief. Next, Campbell urged that Gomez’s failure to move for class certification before his individual claim became moot caused the putative class claims to become moot as well.

The District Court denied the motion. After limited discovery, the District Court then granted
Campbell’s motion for summary judgment on the merits, relying on the Navy’s sovereign
immunity from suit under the TCPA. The Ninth Circuit reversed. It agreed that Gomez’s case remained live but concluded that Campbell was not entitled to “derivative sovereign immunity.” 

The Supreme Court took the case and ruled that a mere unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not automatically moot a plaintiff’s case, so the District Court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate Gomez’s complaint.  While Article III’s “cases” and “controversies” limitation requires that “an actual controversy . . . be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed,” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 67, a case does not become moot as “long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small,” in the litigation’s outcome. Here Gomez’s complaint was not effaced by Campbell’s unaccepted offer to satisfy his individual claim. Under principles of contract law, Campbell’s settlement bid and Rule 68 offer of judgment, once rejected, had no continuing efficacy. With no settlement offer operative, the parties remained adverse; both retained the same stake in the litigation they had at the outset. (Of course, our readers may well recognize that laying a legal controversy to rest may not be quite the same thing as making a contract.) 

On the merits, less interesting to our readers, Campbell’s status as a federal contractor did not entitle it to immunity from suit for its violation of the TCPA. Unlike the United States and its agencies, federal contractors do not enjoy absolute immunity. A federal contractor who simply performs as directed by the Government may be shielded from liability for injuries caused by its conduct. But no “derivative immunity” exists when the contractor has exceeded its authority or its authority was not validly conferred.

The decision resolved a circuit split on the settlement offer issue, and closed the loop on an issue left open by the Court in its 2013 decision in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk.

Interestingly, the majority declined to address the related issue whether the result would have been different if Campbell had actually paid up rather than merely offered to pay. “That question is appropriately reserved for a case in which it is not hypothetical. "

The Chief Justice dissented, arguing that “The problem for Gomez is that the federal courts exist to solve real disputes, not to rule on a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief already there for the taking.”  It seemed beyond dispute that the offer made would have fully satisfied Gomez’s claims. "That makes the case moot, and Gomez is not entitled to a ruling on the merits of a moot case.”  

The ruling may impact other consumer type claims under statutes, such as the TCPA, under which damages can be easily calculated.  But one has to wonder about a rule in which  federal courts are forced to preside over cases where plaintiffs insist on litigating, with all of the burden and expenses, even when they have been offered 100% of what they could possibly recover. 

 

Cert Granted in Interesting Class Action Appeal

The Supreme Court has granted cert in an important case raising the issue whether a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction under both Article III and 28 U. S. C. §1291 to review an order denying class certification after the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss their individual claims with prejudice. See MICROSOFT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SETH BAKER, ET AL., No. 15-457 (U.S., petition granted 1/15/16).

A first group of plaintiffs appealed a denial of class certification, seeking interlocutory review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). Rule 23(f) gives federal courts of appeals “unfettered discretion” to “permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action certification.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendment. They argued the class-certification denial “constitute[d] the ‘death knell’ for this litigation” because the individual claims about their game consoles were too small to justify litigating on their own to final judgment. The Ninth Circuit denied the petition, and the plaintiffs eventually resolved their individual claims by an agreement with Microsoft.

A few years later, the same lawyers as in the original consolidated litigation filed a new lawsuit—again in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington—on behalf of respondents, a handful of Xbox 360 owners who allegedly did not sue in the prior case. Respondents pressed the same claims as their predecessors and they likewise requested certification of a nationwide console class. They argued the Ninth Circuit’s intervening decision in Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, 617 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2010) now allowed certification of their proposed classes.  (A careful reading shows that case did not  did not change the law relevant to this case.) As a result, the district court struck respondents’ class allegations. It found the reasoning in the first denial of class certification (by a different judge) persuasive and that nothing in Wolin undermined the previous analysis.  Baker v. Microsoft Corp., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1280 (W.D. Wash. 2012). Invoking Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f), respondents sought immediately to appeal the district court’s order striking their class allegations. As in the previous case, respondents’ counsel asserted that “the district court’s order effectively kills this case.” The Ninth Circuit denied the petition, and remanded the case back to the district court.  

Instead of pressing their individual claims, respondents tried an end run, as they moved on remand to dismiss their claims with prejudice. Respondents explained that they wanted such an order so as to appeal the class decision, despite defendant's observation that plaintiffs would have no right to appeal the order striking class allegations after entry of their requested dismissal.  The district court granted the dismissal with prejudice.

The Ninth Circuit assumed jurisdiction over respondents’ appeal, holding that in the absence of a
settlement, a stipulation that leads to a dismissal with prejudice does not destroy the adversity in that judgment necessary to support an appeal of a class certification denial. That ruling seemed to conflict with Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), and the rule plaintiffs may not manufacture an immediate appeal by dismissing and thereby showing that a class certification denial has in fact sounded the “death knell” of their claims.

On the merits, the Ninth Circuit thought the district court had misread Wolin, and remanded for further proceedings. 

As our readers may know, courts disagree on whether plaintiffs seeking to represent a class “may appeal from a judgment entered after a voluntary dismissal with prejudice.” TASHIMA & WAGSTAFFE, FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 16:396 (2015); see also 6 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE §23.46 (3d ed. 2015) (explaining that while some courts allow such appeals of de-certification orders, “other courts consider this result untenable, because it allows the putative class representative to evade the policy against piecemeal review by waiving his or her individual claims”). Five circuits have held that a court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to review a denial of class  certification where the plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice. E.g.,  Bowe v. First of Denver Mortg. Investors, 613 F.2d 798, 801 (10th Cir. 1980). The Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have since adopted the same view. Reviewing a case in which the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all of their claims to manufacture finality, the Third Circuit held that such a “procedural sleight-of-hand” does not create appellate jurisdiction. Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 729 F.3d 239, 245-47 (3d Cir. 2013). The Fourth Circuit likewise has held that when a putative class plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the individual claims underlying a request for class certification, a court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to decide the issue whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff's request for class certification. Rhodes v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 636 F.3d 88, 100 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011); see also Himler v. Comprehensive Care Corp., 993 F.2d 1537 (4th Cir. 1993) (unpublished opinion) (same). And the Seventh Circuit has held that it will not review the district court’s refusal to certify a class when the plaintiffs requested and were granted a voluntary dismissal of their claims. Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 629 (7th Cir. 2001). 

The Eleventh Circuit has gone even further, holding that it has no jurisdiction whenever a plaintiff appeals from a final judgment that resulted from a voluntary dismissal with prejudice.  See Druhan v. Am. Mut. Life, 166 F.3d 1324, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 1999). It does not matter whether the dismissal with prejudice was requested only as a means of establishing finality in the case such that the plaintiff could appeal an interlocutory order—an order that the plaintiff believes effectively disposed of her case. Id. at 1326. Nor does it matter whether the interlocutory order did, in fact, eliminate the plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 1327 n.7. In either case, neither 28 U.S.C. § 1291 nor Article III permits the
appeal. Id. at 1326-27. Druhan was not a class action, but courts have since confirmed that its 
categorical holding applies equally to class actions. See Woodard v. STP Corp., 170 F.3d 1043, 1044 (11th Cir. 1999); Kay v. Online Vacation Ctr. Holdings Corp., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1373-75 (S.D. Fla. 2008).

Only two circuits now hold that a named plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal with prejudice creates a sufficiently adverse—and thus appealable—final decision for the plaintiff to obtain review of a class-certification denial. Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2014); Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 176, 178-79 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1025 (1991).

 The Supreme Court now looks poised to resolve this split.

American Tort Reform Foundation Releases Judicial Hellhole List

 The American Tort Reform Foundation recently published its report identifying the top "judicial Hellholes" for 2015-16.

The top (or bottom?)  jurisdictions are California, NY (asbestos), Florida, Missouri, Madison County, Ill., Louisiana, Hidalgo County, Texas, Newport News, Virginia. and the Eastern District of Texas.

The "watch list" includes West Virginia, Philadelphia (your humble blogger's home base), New Jersey, and Pottawatomie County, Oklahoma.

According to the ATRF, California is the epicenter for lawyers trolling to bring disability access lawsuits against small businesses and ridiculous class action lawsuits against food and beverage companies. Certain areas of the state are also a hotbed for asbestos litigation. Local district attorneys and government agencies have taken it upon themselves to partner with private contingency fee lawyers, leading them to bring novel claims against makers of paint and prescription drugs.

New York City is listed for its ongoing treatment of the asbestos mass tort.

Florida ranks next because, according the ATRF, the Florida Supreme Court issues liability-expanding rulings that are out of sync with courts in the rest of the country. Even when the state legislature, which is heavily influenced by trial lawyers, manages to enact reforms, the state’s high court "nullifies them in favor of boundless liability in the Sunshine State."

Our home base makes the watch list since the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas hosts one of the largest mass tort dockets in the nation. The court effectively withdrew its open invitation to lawsuits from around the country with the adoption of some procedural reforms in 2012, but the jurisdiction is again experiencing a rise in out-of-state pharmaceutical claims, notes ATRF. Changes on the state high court that could favor plaintiffs, the state’s embattled attorney general’s alliance with private plaintiffs’ lawyers, and a doubling of disability access lawsuits are additional reasons for concern in the Keystone State, says ATRF.

This year's report also includes a discussion of the MDL process, noting the increase in the portion of the federal court docket that is in an MDL.  ATRF states that when the MDL discovery process is concluded, judges often follow a practice of selecting “bellwether” claimants for trial. The selection process can take many forms, including allowing each side to identify cases for trial. In some
instances, however, plaintiffs’ lawyers will simply dismiss the cases chosen by the defendant (or even cases selected by plaintiffs themselves) on the theory that they will be the weakest with respect to success on the merits. The plaintiffs’ lawyers try to select what they perceive to be their “best” cases as bellwethers, rather than representative cases, and when transferee judges have not performed any sort of gatekeeping function, neither the court nor the parties are in a position to know whether the bellwethers are in any way representative of many other claimants in the pool, argues ATRF.

 

Hon. Arlin M. Adams- A brief tribute

Upon graduating from law school, I had the great privilege of serving as a law clerk to the Hon. Arlin M. Adams, who sat on the Third Circuit for nearly two decades.  Judge Adams passed away last week at the age of 94.

The last opportunity I had to see the Judge was at a special exhibit earlier this year at the University of Pennsylvania Library, which reunited two of the few remaining copies of the Emancipation Proclamation that were autographed by Abraham Lincoln.  History buffs may recall that in 1864, a few specially printed copies of the Emancipation Proclamation, autographed by Lincoln, were put on sale at the Great Central Fair in Philadelphia’s Logan Square (visible from your humble blogger's office). And the occasion, merging history, Penn, Philadelphia, and an extraordinary legal document, was a perfect setting for an appearance by Judge Adams.

To the bench, Judge Adams brought an all too rare combination of brilliance, wisdom, civility, and insight. To his clerks, he was an invaluable mentor and teacher.  There was arguably no better way to be introduced to the legal world than mine, as I walked each morning through the courtyard of Independence Hall where the Constitution was crafted, to work in the chambers of Judge Adams in the federal court house a block away.  He was truly a scholar of substantive law and legal procedure.

His private practice and public service roles alone would mark him as a giant in the legal community. But it was his ability to be conservative and compassionate, a firm believer in the democratic process and a staunch defender of civil rights, in particular the freedom of religion, that marked his stature.

Susquehanna University has created the Arlin M. Adams Center for Law and Society at Susquehanna, and our alma mater Penn Law School established the Arlin M. Adams Chair on Constitutional Law in his honor in 2005. But his legacy may be found in more modest events. For example, appellate advocates can recount numerous examples of oral arguments in which young, new, or struggling advocates would find Judge Adams gently questioning them so their essential argument made it into the record -- not because he agreed with them necessarily, but because their clients deserved to at least be heard.

Simple, modest, honest, Judge Adams was a child of the Depression, served in the Navy in WWII, and went on to become a great judge.  While many of the articles on his passing will undoubtedly talk about the three times he was on the short list for the Supreme Court and not selected, to emphasize that would be to ignore the enormous influence he had on a generation of lawyers and the tremendous role model he should continue to be for future generations of lawyers and judges.

 

Fairness in Class Action Litigation Bill Moving Forward

Earlier this year we posted about the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act when it was approved by the House Judiciary Committee.

Our readers know that this type of bill generally is aimed at the so-called no injury class actions in which not all of the class members are injured, sometimes even most of the class is not injured -- for example purchasers of a consumer product with an alleged design defect that has not manifested itself in most of the units. Such classes create issues for defendants, plaintiffs, and the courts. The bill's sponsors argue that when classes are certified that include members who do not have the same type and scope of injury as the class representatives, those members siphon off limited compensatory resources. Classes including uninjured parties can also artificially inflate the size of the class to command a larger settlement value.

Now comes word the bill is tentatively scheduled for consideration by the full House of Representatives early in 2016.

If enacted, the law would require the moving party to affirmatively demonstrates that each proposed class member suffered the same type and scope of injury as the named class representative or representatives. And any certification decision in a class action regarding personal injury or economic loss must include a determination, based on a rigorous analysis of the evidence presented, that the requirement was satisfied.

SHB A Finalist for Product Liability Department of the Year

The American Lawyer recently recognized Shook, Hardy & Bacon as a finalist in its Product Liability Litigation Department of the Year competition. Shook won the competition in 2008 and 2012 and was a finalist in 2010. (The American Lawyer did not include a product liability category in its 2014 competition.)


The American Lawyer evaluated firms on their product liability results achieved in a two-year period from July 1, 2013, to June 30, 2015.  AmLaw notes that our team has defended 110 active class actions and 135 product liability claims in 25 countries in the last two years.  The article cites notable defense verdicts for Boston Scientific in device litigation, for Altria in toxic tort cases, and quotes clients touting the firm's  "expertise in a number of different areas" and work in the forefront of offering alternative fee arrangements.

We are appreciative of the clients who entrust us with some of their most challenging product matters, allowing us to show our stuff.

SHB Named a Product Liability Group of the Year

Proud to note that Law360 has named Shook, Hardy & Bacon among its 2015 Product Liability Practice Groups of the Year.

For the 2015 Practice Group of the Year awards, Law360 received a record 700 submissions for the series — now in its sixth year — and selected 184 winners across 30 practice areas for honors. Winners were chosen based on submissions covering major successes spanning from October 1, 2014 through October 1, 2015.

 

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Important Preemption Decision

Last week the Sixth Circuit issued a significant opinion in Yates v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. 15-3104, 2015 WL 8538119 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 2015), upholding impossibility preemption of design defect claims against brand-name drug manufacturers.

Yates alleged she experienced a stroke while using the ORTHO EVRA® birth control patch, and sued the manufacturers of the patch.  Yates alleged five causes of action against defendants: (1) strict liability in tort—failure to warn; (2) strict liability in tort—manufacturing defect; (3) negligence; (4) breach of implied warranty; and (5) breach of express warranty.  The district court granted summary judgment as to Yates's failure to warn claim. 2014 WL 1369466 (N.D.Ohio Apr. 7, 2014). Thereafter, the district court granted summary judgment as to Yates's remaining claims and entered final judgment dismissing the case. 76 F.Supp.3d 680 (N.D.Ohio 2015). Yates timely appealed the district court's dismissal of all five of her causes of action.  The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Failure to warn.

To establish a claim against a drug manufacturer for failure to warn under New York law, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the warning was inadequate and that the failure to adequately warn of the dangers of the drug was a proximate cause of his or her injuries. Krasnopolsky v. Warner–Lambert Co., 799 F.Supp. 1342, 1346 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (quoting Glucksman v. Halsey Drug Co., 160 A.D.2d 305, 553 N.Y.S.2d 724, 726 (1990)). The manufacturer's duty to warn extends to the treating physician, and not directly to the patient. Glucksman, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 726. It has long been the law in New York that prescription medicine warnings are adequate when information regarding the precise malady incurred was communicated in the prescribing information. Alston v. Caraco Pharm., Inc., 670 F.Supp.2d 279, 284 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (quoting Wolfgruber v. Upjohn Co., 72 A.D.2d 59, 423 N.Y.S.2d 95, 96–97 (1979)).  In this case, the “precise malady incurred” was a stroke, and the risk of stroke was communicated in the prescribing information. Defendants mentioned the risk of stroke several times in the package inserts. The label specifically stated there was an increased risk of several serious conditions including stroke. Thus, there was no genuine issue of material fact for a jury on the issue of whether defendants failed to adequately warn Yates, through her prescribing medical provider, of the risk of stroke associated with the product. 

Preemption

Readers know that state law claims can be preempted expressly in a federal statute or regulation, or impliedly, where congressional intent to preempt state law is inferred.  Congress may intend federal law to occupy the field,  or state law may conflict with a federal statute.  Conflict preemption exists where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal law, or when the state law is an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. A court needs to ascertain whether federal law expressly prohibits the defendant from complying with state law, or there is sufficient, sometimes termed clear evidence, that the FDA would have prohibited the defendant from taking the necessary steps under state law.

The next issue in this case was whether defendants could have complied with their alleged duty under New York law to have designed a safer drug, given FDA approvals of the design. The court reviewed Supreme Court guidance in three recent opinions on federal preemption in pharmaceutical products liability suits: LevineMensing, and  Bartlett, in which plaintiff argued that the manufacturers could comply with both federal and state law by choosing not to make the drug at all. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that impossibility preemption barred the plaintiff's claims. As for drug redesign, the Court found that was impossible for two reasons: (1) the FDCA requires generic drugs to have the same active ingredients, route of administration, dosage form, strength, and labeling as the brand-name drug on which it is based; and thus the drug was “chemically incapable” of being redesigned. 

New York law provides that a product is defectively designed if  the product, as designed, was not reasonably safe because there was a substantial likelihood of harm and it was feasible to design the product in a safer manner. Doomes v. Best Transit Corp., 17 N.Y.3d 594, 608, 935 N.Y.S.2d 268, 958 N.E.2d 1183 (2011). New York follows a “risk-utility” approach to determining whether a product is not reasonably safe, which calls for consideration of several factors: (1) the utility of the product to the public as a whole and to the individual user; (2) the nature of the product—that is, the likelihood that it will cause injury; (3) the availability of a safer design; (4) the potential for designing and manufacturing the product so that it is safer but remains functional and reasonably priced; (5) the ability of the plaintiff to have avoided injury by careful use of the product; (6) the degree of awareness of the potential danger of the product which reasonably can be attributed to the plaintiff; and (7) the manufacturer's ability to spread any cost related to improving the safety of the design.

The court concluded that Yates's post-approval design defect claim was clearly preempted by federal law. FDA regulations provide that once a drug, whether generic or brand-name, is approved, the manufacturer is prohibited from making any major changes to the qualitative or quantitative formulation of the drug product, including inactive ingredients, or in the specifications provided in the approved application. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(2)(i). Moderate changes must be reported to the FDA at least 30 days prior to distribution of the drug product made using the change. Id. § 314.70(c).  Based on the plain meaning of the regulation,  defendants could not have altered the dosage of estrogen without submission to the FDA and the agency's approval prior to distribution of the product made using the change. Changing the dosage level of the active ingredient of ORTHO EVRA® constituted a “major change."  Quite simply, federal law prohibited defendants from decreasing the dosage of estrogen post-approval.

Readers should note the Sixth Circuit going out of its way to state that the FDA pre-approval requirement for design changes applied to all prescription drugs, with a reference to “branded or generic” drugs.  The court also rejected plaintiff's contention that there is no federal law that would have prohibited defendants from designing a different drug in the first instance, as opposed to altering an approved design. Yates's argument regarding defendants' pre-approval duty was too attenuated. To imagine such a pre-approval duty exists, a court would have to speculate that had defendants designed ORTHO EVRA® differently, the FDA would have approved the alternate design. Next, the court would have to assume that Yates would have selected this method of birth control from all the choices, and in the face of whatever warnings were on the label. Further the court would have to suppose that this alternate design would not have caused Yates to suffer a stroke. "This is several steps too far".  The argument was contingent upon whether the FDA would approve the alternate design in the first place, and this “never start selling” claim was also preempted because it mirrored the “stop selling” claim rejected in Bartlett.   

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on all claims ( the others on fact-specific issues we won't get into here).

 

New Clinical Robotics Blog

My colleagues at Shook Hardy & Bacon have launched the Shook Clinical Robotics Law Blog to examine legal trends and developments in clinical robotics. The blog is primarily authored by Shook Miami Partner Mihai Vrasmasu.

His team represents pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers facing complex product liability claims involving medical devices and prescription drugs, and advises clients on potential issues with complex medical devices, the use of robots in regulated occupations, and hacks of medical devices.

If you are in the device space, worth a look.

SHB Recognized as Client Service A-Team

BTI Consulting Group has ranked Shook, Hardy & Bacon in the BTI Client Service A-Team 2016: The Survey of Law Firm Client Service Performance, now ranked in the top 50.

To compile its list, BTI conducted in-depth interviews with corporate counsel at some of the world's largest companies and noted direct, unprompted feedback about the firm. The resulting rankings evaluate more than 300 law firms on 17 activities that drive superior client service, including the four most strategic activities: providing value; understanding client business; client focus; commitment to help. The stated focus is on which law firms the legal decision makers recognize for delivering the absolute best levels of client service. The BTI Client Service A-Team list is used by law firms and corporate counsel alike to assess how law firms up in client service delivery.

Proud of our team and grateful to our clients for entrusting us with some of their most thorny litigation issues.